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Abstract
This Article will examine two possible models that seek to resolve the tension in principle:
The U.S. model, under which speech enjoys preeminence, and the Israeli model, that protects
human dignity as the principal value. Section I will outline and analyze a recent Israeli case that
led to the first criminal conviction for the violation of an Israeli statute prohibiting the infliction of
harm on religious sentiments. This case will provide a reference point for a three-part comparative
analysis of the U.S. and Israeli models. Section II will address the normative infrastructure that
separates the two models, Sections III and IV will assess the institutional divergence between
the two legal systems, and Sections V and VI will examine consequent doctrinal differences.
Moving beyond comparative legal analysis, Section VII will put forward the hypothesis that the
source of the difference in jurisprudence arises at least in part out of a different cultural perception
regarding the core meaning of “speech” or ”expression” in these two jurisdictions. Drawing upon
this sociological, or cultural, understanding, Section VIII will suggest that perhaps it is passion,
not merely reason, that organizes the realm of public discourse (at least in some jurisdictions
and some cultures), and if so, legal doctrine and theory should be modified accordingly. Finally,
Section IX will comment briefly on the value (and limits) of comparative law in light of the above
understandings.
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INTRODUCTION
What is it about the clash between religious beliefs and free-
dom of expression that sparks such a violent interaction? A re-
cent chapter in this centuries-old battle occurred after a Danish
newspaper published cartoons depicting the prophet Muham-
mad in an unfavorable light.' The cartoon offended segments
of the Muslim community and provoked riots, killings, embassy
attacks, boycotts of Danish produce and strained diplomatic rela-
tions between the Danish government and the Muslim commu-
nity.2 Freedom of speech seemed under siege; other European
newspapers3 and President Bush issued statements supporting
* Visiting Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at
Berkeley and Faculty of Law, University of Haifa. I wish to thank Edan Laron, Hadas
Agmon and Shira Avnat from Haifa and Robert Studley and Alexis Kelly from Boalt
Hall for the extensive research. I have benefited from the comments of the participants
in the conference held by the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on Comparative Examination of Hate Speech Pro-
tection. Also helpful were the comments of the participants in the seminar on the
Perspectives on the Legal Theory ofJoirgen Habermas, held by the European Institute
in Italy. Lastly, I learned from the participants in the lecture series at the Center for the
Study of Law and Society at UC Berkeley. All errors, of course, are mine.
1. The cartoons were published on September 30, 2005, in the Danish newspaper
Jylands-Posten. The text that accompanied the cartoons explained that the publication
was intended to question self-censorship exercised on matters related to the prophet
Muhammad. See Muhammed's Ansigt,JvLLANDs-PosTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, available at
http://epaper.jp.dk/30-09-2005/demo/JP_04-03.html; see also Q&A: The Muhammad
Cartoons Row, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/4677976.
stm.
2. See Hassan M. Fattah, Caricature of Muhammad Leads to Boycott of Danish Goods,
N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 31, 2005, at A3; see also Salman Masood, Two Die as Pakistan Cartoon Rage
Turns Violent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A6 (describing the Muslim community's
outrage over the publication of this cartoon). The boycott forced the Danish govern-
ment to become involved. The Danish prime minister refused to apologize on behalf of
a private newspaper, but stated his personal discomfort with the publication.
3. The German newspaper Die Welt published the cartoons on February 1, 2006,
and the French newspaper France-Soir did the same, but the editor who published the
cartoons was later fired by the French-Egyptian owner of the newspaper. See Rachel
Saloom, You Dropped a Bomb On Me, Denmark: A Legal Examination of the Cartoon Contro-
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the freedom of the Danish press to depict the Prophet Muham-
mad in cartoons, including depictions that portray the prophet
with bombs sticking out of his beard or head-cover. Later, as the
Muslim outrage intensified, the message was modified to include
a call for a "responsible" use of the freedom of the press.4 The
president of Iran replied by holding a contest soliciting cartoon
depictions of the Holocaust, in the name of freedom of speech
and the press,5 and the leader of Hezbollah, before roughly
700,000 Shi'ite believers, suggested that the struggle will not end
until an apology is issued and the laws in Europe are amended to
prohibit such "insults to the prophet."6 The editor of the Danish
newspaper responded by issuing a dubious apology,7 and the EU
versy and Response As It Relates to the Prophet Muhammad and Islamic Law, 8 RUTGERSJ. L. &
RELIGION 1, 1 (2006) (carefully outlining the sequence of events); see also Craig S.
Smith, Next Step by Weekly in Paris May be to Mock the Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at
A14; Muhammad Cartoon Row Intensifies, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/4670370.stm (noting that "It]he president of the French Council of
the Muslim Faith ("CFCM"), Dalil Boubakeur, described France-Soir's publication as an
act of 'real provocation towards the millions of Muslims living in France."').
4. SeeJoel Brinkley & Ian Fisher, U.S. Says It Also Finds Cartoons of Muhammad Offen-
sive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at A3 (regarding President Bush's position on this matter,
a State Department spokesman said that freedom of expression "entails responsibility
and judgment"). But see Jim VandeHei, Bush Shifts on Muslim Protests, WASH. POST, Feb.
9, 2006, at Al (stating that Bush condemned the violence but not the cartoons).
5. The contest was held by the most popular newspaper in Iran, Hamshari. The
editor said that the contest would test the Western world's commitment to freedom of
speech. See Nazila Fathi, Contest for Cartoons Mocking the Holocaust Announced in Tehran,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at A10. Israeli cartoonists replied by holding a contest on the
most offensive cartoon depicting Jews or Jewish religious symbols, asserting that a relig-
ion must accept self-ridiculing cartoons and humor in order to defend itself from big-
otry and hatred. See Aaron Wenner, TA Artist in Self-Denigrating Response to Holocaust
Cartoons, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at 1. A similar debate also took place in En-
gland concerning a bill that prohibited racial and religious jokes. See, e.g., Religious Jokes
"Won't Be Crime", BBC NEWS, Dec. 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/polit-
ics/4075831.stm; see also Anna Bluston, Religious and Secular Dialogue Should Rule OK,
CHARTIST (U.K), Apr. 2005, http://www.chartist.org.uk/articles/econsoc/apr05blus-
ton.htm. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, Ch. 1. (U.K), was enacted, follow-
ing a lengthy parliamentary and public debate, in February 2006. See Peter Cumper, The
United Kingdom and the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 13, 34 (2007) (discussing the enact-
ment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act as a response to the United Kingdom's
governmental "inertia" in the field of blasphemy).
6. See Hezbollah Leader to Bush: "Shut Up", CBS NEWS, Feb. 9, 2006, http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/ 2006/02/09/world/ main I 300246.shtml.
7. On February 19, 2006, a handful of Arab newspapers published an apology in
the name of the Danish newspaper editor. See, e.g., Saudi Newspapers PublishJyllands Pos-
ten's Apology, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.
asp?page=2006%5C02%5C20%5Cstory_20-2-2006_pg7_34. Only hours after this publi-
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dispatched a chief delegate to the Middle East to mend the rift.'
The matter is still litigated in courts in Europe.'
At the same time, a Muslim cleric in Britain discovered that
freedom of expression is far from an absolute right. From his
pulpit he declared that death of non-Muslims can be, as far as
Islam is concerned, an act that isn't necessarily condemnable
even if such death was inflicted for no reason; that Jews should
be removed from the face of the earth; and that Muslim dignity
cannot "be regained unless with blood."' He was convicted for
inciting racial hatred."
Clearly, there is a difference between incendiary cartoons in
a Danish newspaper and a call from the pulpit of a cleric to his
followers that extols racially or religiously motivated violence.
But the point is clear: The clash between freedom of expression
and religious beliefs (and sentiments) is potent.
This Article will examine two possible models that seek to
resolve the tension in principle: The U.S. model, under which
speech enjoys preeminence, and the Israeli model, that protects
human dignity as the principal value. Section I will outline and
analyze a recent Israeli case that led to the first criminal convic-
tion for the violation of an Israeli statute prohibiting the inflic-
tion of harm on religious sentiments.' 2 This case will provide a
reference point for a three-part comparative analysis of the U.S.
cation Jyllands-Posten issued a denial on the newspaper's website. A qualified apology
was issued on January 30, 2006. The newspaper didn't apologize for the publication
itself, only stated that the hurt to religious feelings was not intended. See Hassan M.
Fattah, Caricature of Muhammad Leads to Boycott of Danish Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006,
at A3 (stating that the newspaper issued an apology, but Danish authorities have re-
fused to take action because the government will not get involved in such matters).
8. See Brian Knowlton, Rice Warns Muslims to Curb Violence; Fury Over Cartoons Shows
Signs of Easing, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 2006, at 3.
9. A group of French Muslim organizations filed suit against the French newspaper
that republished the cartoons. The suit was dismissed on March 22, 2007, but the plain-
tiffs may appeal. See Craig Smith, French Court Rules for Newspaper that Printed Muhammad
Cartoons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at 5.
10. See In Quotes: Hamza's Preachings, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/l/hi/uk/4690084.stm (quoting speeches of cleric). Thejury watched hundreds of
tape recorded speeches of Abu Hamza, which were the main basis for his conviction.
11. A jury of the Old Bailey court in London sentenced Abu Hamza al-Masri to
seven years in prison for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred during his ser-
mons. Mr. Justice Hughes said to Abu Hamza, "You are entitled to your views, and in
this country you are entitled to express them, but only up to the point where you incite
murder or hatred." Hamza Jailed for Seven Years, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (U.K.), Feb. 7,
2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1704304,00.html.
12. The statute has been on the books since the time of the British Mandate. It
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and Israeli models. Section II will address the normative infra-
structure that separates the two models, Sections III and IV will
assess the institutional divergence between the two legal systems,
and Sections V and VI will examine consequent doctrinal differ-
ences. Moving beyond comparative legal analysis, Section VII
will put forward the hypothesis that the source of the difference
in jurisprudence arises at least in part out of a different cultural
perception regarding the core meaning of "speech" or "expres-
sion" in these two jurisdictions. Drawing upon this sociological,
or cultural, understanding, Section VIII will suggest that perhaps
it is passion, not merely reason, that organizes the realm of pub-
lic discourse (at least in some jurisdictions and some cultures),
and if so, legal doctrine and theory should be modified accord-
ingly. Finally, Section IX will comment briefly on the value (and
limits) of comparative law in light of the above understandings.
I. THE ISRAELI APPROACH: THE SUSZKIN CASE
On June 27, 1997, Tatyana Suszkin entered an area under
the control of the Palestinian Authority in Hebron, carrying pos-
ters, designed and produced by her, depicting a hand-drawn pig
wearing a Muslim head-dress (Kafia) with the name Muhammad
in Arabic and English sketched on its torso.' 3 The swine held a
pencil with one of its hooves and appeared to be writing the Ko-
ran while stepping on it. 4 Suszkin carried glue and spray-paint,
and was wearing a Kahana-Hai T-shirt. 15 Israeli soldiers detained
was originally enacted in 1936 as section 149 of the Criminal Code Ordinance (Pales-
tine 1936).
13. See Jewish Extremist Faces Jail, GUARDIAN (U.K), Dec. 31, 1997, at 14.
14. See id.
15. Meir Kahana formed a political party in Israel that advocated the strict applica-
tion of biblical law towards non-Jews, primarily Arabs. Kahana's doctrines would result
in the confiscation of all Arab property, the disenfranchisement of Arab voters in elec-
tions for the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), the invalidation and prohibition of any
interfaith marriage between Jews and non-Jews, and, ultimately, the deportation of
Arabs from Israel into neighboring Arab countries. After an unsuccessful challenge to
its eligibility, Kahana's party ran for election in 1984 and secured one seat in the 120-
member Knesset. In response, the Knesset amended election laws to prohibit parties
that support a racist platform and/or endorse actions that are racist or designed to
undermine the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Accordingly, Kahana's
second bid for the Knesset was barred. In 1990 Kahana was murdered in the United
States and his followers established a movement called Kahana-Hai (Kahana is alive).
After his followers turned to actions against Arabs, the movement was declared a terror
organization under Israeli law. For a review of these events, see EA 11280/02 Cent.
Elections Commission for Sixteenth Knesset v. MK Tibby [2003] IsrSC 57(4) 1, 52-53.
20071
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her and handed her over to the Israeli police. The following
day, while on bail, she threw a stone at a Palestinian vehicle driv-
ing in the Hebron area.' 6 She was convicted in the district court
inter alia for attempting to hurt religious feelings (§173 of the
Israeli Penal Code) and received a sentence of three years in
jail.17 The Israeli Supreme Court, in a reasoned decision, de-
nied her appeal.' 8
Justice Or, writing for the Supreme Court, stated that while
the offense has been on the books since the British Mandate,
this case represented the first time the Supreme Court had ad-
dressed a conviction for the violation of the prohibition against
the infliction of harm on religious sentiments.19 The conviction
received considerable public attention. 2" The general outcry
that followed the media reports of the provocation ("how could
a Jew deface Muslim religious symbols, when we, the Jews, have
been the victims of such actions for generations?") was coun-
tered by a double standard claim ("the Attorney General has
chosen to ignore equally offensive depictions of Jews and Jewish
religious symbols that can be found in Arab posters"). Some
have even claimed that this prosecution amounts to the persecu-
tion of a specific viewpoint which the government seeks to sup-
press ("she was charged because she is a settler who merely tried
to express her protest against the Arab propaganda by using sim-
ilar methods").
Placing this case in a comparative perspective reveals the sig-
nificant gap that exists between the U.S. and Israeli protections
of freedom of speech. Had such a conviction been entered in
16. See generally CrimC (Jer) 436/97 Israel v. Suszkin, [1997] IsrDC 97(5) 730.
17. It should be noted that Ms. Suszkin was convicted of an attempt only, since
there was not sufficient evidence that she actually distributed or posted the poster. She
was also convicted for violating the prohibition against committing a racist act
(§ 144DI(a) of the Penal Code - 1977), for attempting to deface property, for endan-
gering life on a highway and for supporting a terror organization (§4 (g) of the Preven-
tion of Terror Ordinance - 1948).
18. See generally CrimA 697/98 Suszkin v. Israel [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 289.
19. See id.
20. Both Ma'ariv and Yedioth Ahronoth (the two major daily Hebrew newspapers),
covered the story extensively, focusing mainly on the religious and political aspects.
The strongest evidence for the public response is the formal apology issued by Presi-
dent Weizman to the mayor of Hebron. MA'ARIV, July 1, 1997. On the other hand,
Geula Cohen, a former right wing Knesset Member ("MK") in her essay Hebron on Fire,
expressed the opinion that the real victims in Hebron are the Jewish settlers and not
the Palestinians. See Geula Cohen, Hebron on Fire, MA'ARIV, July 4, 1997.
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the United States, it would, in all likelihood, have been quashed,
primarily because the underlying statute criminalizing speech
that harms religious sentiments would have been held as a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.2 Such a gap in systems that pre-
sumably are both committed to basic democratic principles war-
rants a closer examination.
The issues raised by the case, such as the constitutionality of
a law prohibiting speech that inflicts harm on religious senti-
ments, or its application to the facts of the case, have implica-
tions beyond a case-study in comparative law. Israeli legislators,
judges, scholars and activists, and hopefully the public at large,
are currently debating the proper scope of the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression in Israel. 22 As the constitu-
tional committee in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, drafts a
proposal for a comprehensive and unified constitutional docu-
ment,2 - the Suszkin case raises questions that merit serious con-
21. Such a statutory prohibition is content-based, and thus would be subjected to
strict scrutiny. As stated by Justice Marshall in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
"Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); see also
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388-89
(1962); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned that:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to ex-
press any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this for-
bidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity
because of its content would completely undercut the 'profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open.'
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96. But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 271 (1952), sus-
taining a statute prohibiting exhibition in any public place of any publication portray-
ing "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue" of "a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed or religion" that "exposes such a class of citizens to contempt, deri-
sion or obloquy" or which "is productive of breach of the peace or riots." The Court
relied on the then-recent events of WWII and on the history of inter-racial violence in
Illinois to uphold the criminalization of such group libel. The contemporary validity
and scope of the Beauharnais decision is unclear, given the reluctance of the Court to
review the matter in Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
22. For such recent proposals, see A. Bendor, A Proposal of a Constitution For the State
of Israel, 5 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 23, 40-41 (2000); see also The "Israel Democracy Institute"
Proposal, in CONSTITUTION BY CONSENSUS 95, 159-60 (Uri Dromi ed., 2005). Needless to
say, these proposals all seek to guarantee constitutional protection for freedom of ex-
pression.
23. See Protocols of the Constitutional Committee, May 18, 2003, http://www.knesset.
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sideration. Should the U.S. model be adopted? Should it be re-
jected, in favor of an alternative model? A comparative analysis
can thus prove useful not only for scholars but also for those
interested in the practical distinctions between the two models.
Needless to say, the differences in culture and political context
counsel against drawing simplistic lessons from any particular le-
gal model standing on its own. 24 However, if acknowledged and
addressed, these differences in social context may in fact enrich
our understanding of the subject matter. Infusing the doctrinal
differences with social meaning provides a potential basis for
normative evaluation of the two approaches, since the doctrines
may be assessed in light of the social conditions within which
they are set to operate.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, EMOTIONAL HARM
AND NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
As a normative matter, the status of freedom of expression
relative to other rights provides a key theoretical distinction be-
tween the Israeli and U.S. systems. Within a standard system of
human rights protection, based on the insights articulated by
John Stuart Mill, the principle of harm demarcates the bounda-
ries of protected liberty: I am at liberty to move my hands until I
hit my neighbor's nose, at which point I cause her harm and
therefore am not at liberty to proceed." The principle of harm
is not restricted, conceptually, to physical harm, and may include
intangible harms as well, such as harms to one's reputation and
emotional harm, as long as such harms are measurable and veri-
fiable (that is, contain a tangible element). Speech, therefore,
may cause harm not only because it can prompt action, but also
because it can degrade a person. And while a moral agent has
the liberty to express her autonomy through deeds and speech,
others have the right to be free from the harm caused by such
expressions. This basic understanding results in a structure of
rights that does not automatically place a premium on the pro-
gov.il/protocols (opening a series of discussions on different aspects of the constitu-
tion). The Knesset's preliminary draft is available at http://experts.cfisrael.org:81/-ad-
min/proposals.pdf.
24. See David Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 113 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
25. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 55-56 (Alburey Castell ed., Crofts Classics 1947)
(1859).
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tection of expression over other rights. While speech is instru-
mental to the pursuit of truth and for self fulfillment, 26 other
rights play an equally instrumental role in furthering equally im-
portant values, such as the protection of the self and other as-
pects of autonomy.2 7 It is therefore not surprising that most
Western Democracies place limitations on freedom of expres-
sion where such expression amounts to defamation or infringes
on privacy rights or intellectual property. 28 Critically, freedom
of expression is not necessarily "weightier"-whatever that may
mean-than these other rights.
29
It is against that background that the U.S. constitutional
structure is innovative. Entrenching the Millian approach into
the Constitution would have meant granting constitutional pro-
tection to all basic human liberties, nothing more, nothing less.
That would have meant that harmful speech-including speech
that inflicts emotional harm-would not necessarily enjoy any a
priori advantage vis-a-vis other rights (such as the right to be free
from emotional harm). There would be no need to single out
26. The First Amendment justification based on the pursuit of truth was intro-
duced into U.S. jurisprudence injustice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Other justifications, such as the autonomy-based pur-
suit of self fulfillment, have not enjoyed a similar standing in courts. See, e.g., C. EDWIN
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 121 (1989). For criticism of the pursuit of truth
justification as the sole principle behind First Amendment theory see Robert C. Post,
Free Speech and Community: Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 473, 479-
80 (1997). For an extensive discussion of philosophical justifications of free speech that
both overlaps with, and differs from, the present discussion, see FREDERICK SCHAUER,
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
27. For instance, private property is often seen as necessary to ensure self-fulfill-
ment. See, e.g., MARGARETJ. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35-40 (1993) (discussing a
theory of property as personhood).
28. According to Professor Whitman, European privacy protections represent a
manifestation of the fundamental "right to respect and personal dignity." This differs
from American privacy protection which is derived from "values of liberty, and espe-
cially liberty against the state." James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:
Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
29. See DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
765-74 (2002). The way Feldman describes the scope of freedom of expression in the
English law reflects the fact that it does not enjoy any special position. "English law
recognizes that people are generally free to express themselves and to impart informa-
tion in any way they please, in the same way that they are free to do anything else,
except in so far as that freedom is restricted by particular legal constraints." Id. at 773.
See generally RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PER-
SPECTIVE (2006) (providing a comparative view of the weight given to free speech in
Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom).
2007]
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freedom of expression by limiting explicitly the power of govern-
ment to abridge freedom of speech (or of the press). Yet the
U.S. Constitution protects speech specifically, and does not di-
rectly (and in unconditional language) protect, for example, the
freedom from emotional harm, or the right to be free from li-
bel.3 0
It would seem, then, that the basic assumption under the
U.S. model is that the ordinary common law and legislative
processes could provide adequate protection against conduct
(or speech) that inflicts emotional harm (or any other "civil" or
"private" harm). Therefore, these rights are protected at the
common law or statutory levels.31 The right to the free expres-
sion of ideas, however, receives specific protection from the leg-
islative process itself, even if such protection entails limiting the
protection the legislature (or the courts) could provide against
emotional harm.
The fact that the U.S. Constitution does not view freedom
of expression as one liberty co-equal with others, and instead
views it as a constitutive element of democratic sovereignty, de-
mands normative justification. Prominent scholars, such as
Meiklejohn, Habermas, Fiss and recently Post3 2 have argued that
speech and deliberation are essential in at least two ways: 1) par-
ticipation in the process of deliberation amalgamates individuals
and the various communities that comprise a heterogeneous
polity into a community of speakers-a "people"-without which
the concept of (democratic) sovereignty is difficult to grasp; and
2) freedom of speech is a necessary condition for public deliber-
ation and thus a defining element of any true democracy. Ex-
panding on the theory behind these two claims will clarify the
30. The language of the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I, is markedly dif-
ferent from the language of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V. Not only
does the First Amendment single out speech from other kinds of liberties, the Fifth
Amendment subjects liberty and property to the due process of the laws, and thus even
if emotional harm could be construed as an infringement of liberty or property, the
constitutional protection is qualified.
31. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &Joiners, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(emotional harm); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (invasion of privacy);
Beauharanais v. Illinois, 340 U.S. 250, 258-66 (1952) (group libel).
32. SeeJORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 8-17 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Bea-
con Press 1975) (1973); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF GOVERNMENT 1-27 (Law Book Exch. ed., 2000) (1948); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 1109,
1124-35 (1993).
[Vol. 31:76
THE PASSIONATE EXPRESSION OF HATE
difference between the U.S. approach and the alternative ap-
proach that grants equal protection to all rights.
As a conceptual matter, speech plays a critical role in the
formation and justification of political sovereignty, especially in
the case of democracies. Political sovereignty-at least in mod-
ern democracies-emanates from the "people." But how is the
political unit-the people-formed and maintained? Surely, so-
ciological factors such as shared history, identity, tradition, lan-
guage and collective consciousness (or imagination) play a
part.33 Yet it is difficult to conceptualize the processes of consti-
tuting and re-constituting "peoplehood" without recognizing the
expressive domain. The exercise of speech-or at least the per-
ceived exercise-by members of "we, the people" is a necessary
condition for there to be "we," because it is through the expres-
sive domains that a sense of community is maintained (or re-
defined). Put bluntly, voice is an aspect of membership.34 For
the processes of "people-forming" to be viable, members of the
people must have the option-or at least the perceived op-
tion3 5-to speak (at least on matters that define the people).36
As a normative matter, the legally-entrenched ability of each in-
dividual to express herself on any matter of public concern is a
component of the agency-principal relationship between a state
and its citizens. By speaking to the other members of the collec-
tive and the collective itself, the individual infuses his or her au-
tonomous power to choose right from wrong into the collective,
thereby empowering that collective to form and apply values and
priorities; needless to say, this normative dimension is highly sig-
nificant in a polity that defines itself as a deliberative democ-
racy." Speech is therefore an essential ingredient in the social
medium that connects individuals into communities, and more
specifically, into the kind of communities that can be seen as an
expression of self determination (and thus as deserving the rec-
33. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991).
34. SeeALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970).
35. For a critical analysis of the difference between real and perceived freedom of
speech, see generally OWEN FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
36. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA
L. REv. 705, 716 (2004) (reminding us that "[t]he value of participation is central to...
[the various] ways ofjustifying democracy.").
37. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 32, at 1-27.
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ognition of sovereign powers over the individuals). Conse-
quently, curtailing protections of free speech, especially within
the political sphere, poses a challenge to the legitimacy of (dem-
ocratic) sovereignty. 38
This conceptual and normative argument also has sociologi-
cal dimensions. The United States was formed as a nation of
immigrants, not as an organic ethno-political unit, with shared
history, customs and mores. 9 It is no surprise, then, that the
protection of speech was necessary in order to generate "pe-
oplehood." As Robert Post demonstrates, contrary to the com-
mon law model where speech is seen as a threat to solidarity, to
the community mores and to loyalty to King and Country,
speech in the United States-given its highly heterogeneous so-
cial fabric-is essential to the formation of a political commu-
nity, and therefore the constitutional protection of speech can
be seen as protecting that which binds the American meta-com-
munity (or community of communities) together.4 °
Yet, as mentioned above (and as demonstrated by nine-
teenth century liberal thinkers) deliberation, and the constitu-
tional protection thereof, is not important just for the forming
of a polity or for the legitimizing of sovereignty; freedom of
speech is essential for the democratic process itself.4 A corner-
stone of our contemporary democratic theory is that without un-
fettered political speech-or more accurately, nearly unfet-
tered4 2 -democracy faces a crisis of legitimation. Since it is ulti-
38. See generally HAHERMAS, supra note 32.
39. See generally Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blas-
phemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1988). Some claim that stemming
from diversity of communities and values, the unique level of constitutional protection
of freedom of speech in the United States rests on a distinct "American humanistic
value." See Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest
of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. Rav. 377, 378 (2006).
40. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opin-
ion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 684-86 (1990).
41. See MILL, supra note 25, at 55.
42. A governmental regulation absolutely necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest (and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest) is compatible with a democratic
constitutional structure, since in rare cases not regulating speech could lead to the
collapse of the democratic state. Cf Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37
(1949) UacksonJ, dissenting) ("There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact."). One possibility of addressing that danger is by carving out
some expression-that which with certainty will cause the demise of the democratic
structure-outside the scope of the constitutional protection of speech (for example,
[Vol. 31:76
THE PASSIONATE EXPRESSION OF HATE
mately up to the polity to see right from wrong, curtailing the
process of such determination taints the legitimacy of any out-
come. Put in instrumental terms, political speech is essential for
the ability to critique power and promote change.4" Without
speech, democracy would lose the self-reflective ability to reform
unjustified practices, thereby becoming deeply flawed. As schol-
ars have noted, for such reform to occur, there has to exist an
open public sphere where arguments are exchanged and justifi-
cations analyzed."4 This sphere of debate and exchange of ideas
is structured around the concept of public reason: We seek to
convince each other by putting forward arguments that we be-
lieve resonate better with the principles of reason and best re-
flect our sense of justice as an expression of our experience."5
This reason-based sphere requires that communal norms of
decency and respect to the established order be suspended, be-
cause if these norms are allowed to govern the public sphere,
this sphere would become infused with the very same normative
order which should be subject to critical analysis and evaluation
in this sphere. For the sphere of public discourse to generate
legitimacy within a community of speakers to which "we" all be-
long, it must be constructed around the notion of dispassionate
critique;"6 a sphere where all share equal membership (regard-
less of their local community norms) and where all norms may
by defining such expression as "conduct"). Another option is to design a "strict scru-
tiny" test that ensures that in those rare occasions governmental regulation of speech
will pass constitutional muster.
43. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
11 (1966).
44. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (1970); Post,
supra note 40 (discussing the domain of public discourse).
45. On the challenges facing the public reason argument, see Greenawalt, supra
note 26, at 121. For a broader discussion of public reason, see generally GERALD F.
GAuS, JuSTIFiCATORY LIBERALISM (1996); Jfirgen Habermas, Reconciliation through the Pub-
lic Use of Reason: Remarks on Rawls' Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109 (1995); Thomas
McCarthy, Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructionism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,
105 ETHICS 44 (1994);John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv.
765 (1997);John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUBs. Air.
223 (1985);John Rawls, Response to Habermas, 92J. PHIL. 132 (1995); Lawrence B. So-
lum, Constructing the Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729 (1993).
46. As a practical matter, this structure requires sufficient agreement concerning
what counts as a reason-based critique-as opposed, for example, to a passion-based
argument-and that the culture supports reason-based debates, rather than passion-
based decision-making processes. For further discussion of the reason-passion tension,
see John L. Brooke, Reason and Passion in the Public Sphere: Habernas and the Cultural
Historians, 29J. INTERDIsc. HIsT. 43 (1998).
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be equally and continuously criticized and evaluated. Libel, a
perfectly legitimate limit on expression in the private sphere, is
thus muted-or ought to be muted-when the speech is con-
cerned with public figures and/or matters of public concern.47
After all, the sense of indignation and insult, situated at the core
of libel, is a product of our communal norms of decency: We
feel insulted because some "traditional way" of treatment was vio-
lated. Yet such conventions ought to be kept at bay in this public
sphere.4" This is so not because indignation or decency are to
be rejected in principle, but because public deliberation re-
quires that we reflect on the arguments from all perspectives,
without preferring "the way we do things" or granting special
status to customs.
49
Similarly, concern over harm caused to religious sentiments
must yield within the deliberative process. The social space
within which public deliberation takes place must be such that
allows for critical evaluation of religious figures (including
prophets), and what they stand for, even if such critical analysis
offends and insults religious devotees. Otherwise, the sphere of
public reason loses its ability to generate genuine legitimacy.
This two-prong argument corresponds to U.S. positive law.
The U.S. protection of speech is primarily a protection of the
political process, not necessarily an overarching protection of in-
dividual expressions of autonomy.5° Nude dancing, as expres-
sive as it may be, will therefore be subject to greater regulation
than purely political speech. 5 The U.S. Supreme Court repeat-
edly treats libel of public figures or offensive speech related to
matters of public concern differently than it treats libel and of-
fensive speech towards "private" individuals or in the purely pri-
vate sphere.52
47. See MILL, supra note 25, at 54; Post, supra note 39, at 301-05, 330-35.
48. By contrast, in Europe, "[elverybody is protected against disrespect, through
the continental law of 'insult,' a very old body of law that protects the individual right to
'personal honor.'" Whitman, supra note 28, at 1164.
49. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in The
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV 957, 961 (1989); see also MILL, supra note 25, at 22-25;
Post, supra note 47 (discussing individualism as compared to pluralism).
50. But see Fredrick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1808-09 (2004) (suggesting
that political, sociological, and economic factors can be more useful in defining the
boundaries of free speech than other theories, such as theories of legitimation).
51. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-74 (1976).
52. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), sets the standard of a defa-
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While not all U.S. scholars are convinced that the U.S.
model is necessarily superior,53 it is difficult to ignore its influ-
ence.54  The Israeli legislature-in its deliberations regarding
the structure of the Israeli constitutional bill of rights-and the
Israeli courts-in interpreting existing legislation-are thus
faced with the question of whether to adopt the U.S. approach as
they address the tension between freedom of expression (and
the press) and freedom of religion (or more accurately, the pub-
lic interest in accommodating religious sentiments).
Yet for the time being, as a matter of positive law, the consti-
tutional right that organizes the Israeli system is human dig-
nity.55 In 1992, this right was enacted in the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty.56 The Knesset deliberately omitted protec-
tion of speech from the Basic Law.57 A possible explanation for
this legislative choice rests on an assumption that, from the per-
spective of the Knesset, granting freedom of speech constitu-
tional status Would excessively limit governmental powers to bal-
ance (or appease) the different dignitary interests: Those of the
"liberals," who would like to be able to criticize all edifices of
power, and those of the "religious conservatives," who would like
to ensure respect toward "basic values," including the dignity of
mation suit regarding a public figure. See generally Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) (holding that "actual malice" provides "breathing space" to First Amendment
freedoms). A lower standard is set regarding a private figure in Gretz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-47 (1974).
53. Fred Schauer, for example, wonders whether the general-rights model, preva-
lent in modern constitutions, does not offer greater benefits than the U.S. model. See
generally Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1284 (1983).
54. For example, see the elaborated reasoning of Chief Justice Dickson of the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court, as he parts ways from standard U.S. free speech jurisprudence
in R. v. Keegstra, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458 (Can.).
55. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enumerates only several specific
rights such as dignity, property, privacy and liberty. It does not specifically mention
expression. The Israeli Supreme Court is thus faced with interpreting the scope of the
right to human dignity. This interpretative quest is not limited to the determination of
whether freedom of expression is an element of human dignity. In HCJ 721/94 El-Al
Israel Airlines v. Danilovitz [1994) lsrSC 48(5) 749, and HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of
Defense [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94, the Justices suggest different models regarding the rela-
tion between the right for equality and human dignity. See generally Hillel Sommer, The
Non-Enumerated Rights: On the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution, 28 MISHPATIM 257
(1997).
56. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1994, S.H. 90.
57. For the political background that led to the adoption of the Basic Laws, see
Judith Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty-A Biography of Power Struggles, 1(2)
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 323 (1993).
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religion.5" Another explanation rests on the hyper-heterogene-
ity of the Israeli society. While the U.S. community (or commu-
nities) may seem heterogeneous compared with the relative soli-
darity and cohesion of Britain, it is still rather homogenous com-
pared to Israel. The Jewish communities in Israel bring highly
diverse cultures, languages and values to the Israeli social col-
lage. At the time the state was founded, religious Jews from
Yemen and secular Jews from Germany shared little beyond a
rather ephemeral sense of Jewishness. While it would be a mis-
take to undermine the strength of the bond between Jews (as
members of a Jewish people) it will be simply wrong to ignore
the deep divides that separated the various Jewish "publics" that
found their way to Israel. More critically, Israel is not comprised
solely of Jews. Beyond the obvious national cleavage between
Jews and Arabs, the religious and ideological divides are blatant.
Muslims, Christians (Catholic and Greek Orthodox), Druz,
Cherkess and Baha'i are some of the religious communities that
predate the state. Active Communists live next to Libertarians,
Nationalists next to Universalists, and Atheists next to devout be-
lievers. Under these social conditions, U.S. style freedom of ex-
pression, while providing a chance for the communities to gen-
erate a sense of identification with the state (and with the politi-
cal decisions of the central government), also poses a risk of
further fracturing the social bonds that keep the Israeli society
together.
Historically, this risk was countered by three responses:
First, freedom of expression has indeed received prominence.
The Israeli Supreme Court did all that was within its power to
limit the ability of administrative agencies to curtail expression
by interpreting empowering legislation very narrowly.59 Second,
the legislature-British, and later Israeli-sought to entrench
the value of human dignity as a basic foundation for generating
solidarity, thereby mitigating the risks for greater rifts. This is
exemplified in creating the offense of inflicting harm on relig-
ious sentiments. And third, the Court was not granted the power
to exercise judicial review over legislation. Among other things,
such an exercise may be perceived as posing a threat for deepen-
58. See id.; see also PPA (Prisoner Petition Appeal) 4463/94 Golan v. Prison Auth.
[1996] lsrSC 50(4) 136, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/94/630/044/
z0l/94044630.z01.pdf, at 27.
59. See HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871.
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ing social divides.6" This last component was altered by the
"Constitutional Revolution": The Court interpreted the recent
Basic Laws as empowering it to exercise judicial review. 6' How-
ever, at the core of these Basic Laws is the right to Human Dig-
nity, and not freedom of expression.
As courts interpret the scope of Human Dignity, they will
have to decide, either via a case-by-case method or as a matter of
a general theory, whether the right of Human Dignity also en-
compasses the protection of freedom of expression, and if so,
what the contours of protected speech are within the right of
human dignity.
In any event, it is easy to see that cases like Suszkin would
turn out differently in Israel than they would in the United
States: While freedom of expression could be derived from
human dignity,62 so could the freedom from dignitary harm.63
In fact, it seems that freedom from dignitary harm is at least as
closely connected to human dignity as freedom of expression.
After all, one's dignity is offended if one cannot freely express
one's attitude; but one's dignity is offended in no lesser terms if
one is shamed, humiliated, or otherwise expressively excluded
from membership in the community, namely the community
whose members' wellbeing (including emotional well-being) is
cared for by the constitutional order. Speech, or an expressive
act that humiliates Muslim worshipers, therefore, has a weaker
claim to heightened constitutional protection in Israel because
that very speech violates other aspects of the right of human dig-
nity, such as a Muslim's right to be free from dignitary harm on
account of their religious beliefs. A different ordering of demo-
cratic values, expressed in a different structure of rights, thus
60. See generally Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 IsR. L. REV.
216 (1999).
61. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC
49(4) 221.
62. In HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Jerusalem District Commander [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456,
468, Justice Barak states that the freedom of expression is a clear expression of human
dignity. The same position is stated by Justice Matza in the Golan case, IsrSC 50(4) 136.
Justice Matza doesn't ignore the fact that the freedom of expression is not specified in
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In his opinion this is not determinative;
the basic human liberty to hear and be heard is the essence of the human dignity,
without which dignity has no meaning.
63. In HCJ 4541/94 Millerv. Minister of Defense [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 131,Justice Dor-
ner says that there is no doubt that the purpose of the Basic Law is to defend from
humiliation.
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appears to be separating the Israeli system from its U.S. counter-
part.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AND
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Another dimension that may impact the level of protection
of speech, including speech that may inflict harm on religious
sentiments, is the institutional dimension. Placing the ultimate
protection of speech in the hands of courts, the executive or the
legislative branch may generate differing types of protection.
This is so because the different branches of government face dif-
ferent generic institutional biases. Elected officials have an insti-
tutional tilt towards the suppression of dissenting political
speech since, as mentioned, this speech is the main venue of
criticizing their actions.64 The rather simplistic understanding
of this bias views speech, as threatening to elected officials be-
cause it may result in negative public opinion, which may result
in these officials not being re-elected. A slightly more nuanced
articulation of this bias suggests that legislators or members of
the executive do not deliberately hinder democratic accountabil-
ity for the sake of undermining critique. To the contrary; demo-
cratically elected officials derive their legitimacy from reasoned
public discourse and its culmination in elections, and therefore
it stands to reason that elected officials would be wary of destabi-
lizing this prong of legitimacy. At the very least, it seems that
elected officials would be just as careful to maintain the viability
of public discourse-given that this discourse is an essential
source of their legitimacy-as would unelected judges. Yet as in-
stitutional biases go, it is not at all far-fetched to assume that
Miles' Law-stating that "where you stand depends on where
you sit" 65-applies. From the legislative seat, or from the execu-
tive office, the governmental goals may appear really pressing
and the consequences of not achieving these goals may appear
ominous. This, according to Miles, is because agencies put in
64. Owen Fiss, for example, describes the First Amendment as a shield that pro-
tects the individual speaker from the State, a shield originally designed for the preserva-
tion of democracy. According to this theory freedom of speech is a pre-condition for
democratic elections. See OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 12-30 (1996).
65. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., The Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
399, 399 (1978).
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charge of devising and enforcing policy in a given field tend to
overvalue the importance of this policy and the dire conse-
quences that may result if the policy is frustrated. Therefore, as
seen from the legislative or executive perspective, speech that
criticizes the governmental goals (or the means to their achieve-
ments) may appear sufficiently dangerous to the well-being of
the collective to warrant its regulation, including its suppression.
The judicial branch, precisely because it is not in charge of
devising and implementing policy for furthering the general wel-
fare of the polity in most areas of life, is better situated to protect
speech and restrict governmental power to regulate speech.
Judges are less likely to over-value the weight of achieving a cer-
tain public goal at the expense of individual rights. After all, the
institutional logic according to which courts operate is the logic
of protecting individual rights, rather than promoting the max-
imization of the general welfare. Therefore, granting the judici-
ary with power to review the policies devised by agencies holds
the promise of correcting, or mitigating, the institutional tilts
embedded in the operational logic of these agencies.
Given that the formation of general-welfare promoting poli-
cies is what politics is about, when judges review such policies
they risk being co-opted by the pressures of politics. The desire
to maintain the differentiation of institutional biases demands
that judges be shielded from party-politics. By ensuring that at
least a segment of the judiciary is unelected, judges are some-
what isolated from pressures of public opinion," opinion that
may insist upon the achievement of the governmental goals.
Other institutional factors come into play in order to maintain a
degree of separation between the logic of the legal system and
the logic of the political system: Judges must abide by legal rules
and arguments rooted in professional discourse and are discour-
aged from engaging in straightforward public policy determina-
tions.67 Judges are also conditioned to view their role as the fa-
66. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SU-
PREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). For a recent revisit on the relationship
between courts and public opinion see Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judi-
cial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
Nov. 2007); Christopher Schroeder, Some Notes on a Principled Pragmatism, 95 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2007).
67. The relationship between legal discourse and other types of political discourse
has received abundant attention since the famous Federalist 78 stated that the courts
are the least dangerous branch, lacking both sword and purse. See generally Richard
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mous umpires, ensuring that the government does not regu-
late speech as speech (content neutrality) let alone favor one
viewpoint over another (viewpoint discrimination). 69 They are
thus less likely to be susceptible to the institutional biases of the
executive or the legislature.
As mentioned, for its first forty-five years the Israeli judiciary
was spared from the burden of exercising constitutional judicial
review, and focused its resources on closely scrutinizing the exer-
cise of discretion by executive agencies. As of 1995, the Israeli
judiciary has joined its U.S. counterpart by receiving-or tak-
ing-the power to review primary legislation. Whereas the Is-
raeli judiciary has been the primary proponent of freedom of
expression vis-A-vis the administration (by instituting an
equivalent of the strict scrutiny test for administrative action) it
remains to be seen whether the Court will be able to maintain
the degree of insularity necessary to exercise the same level of
review vis-A-vis the legislature. In this respect, the U.S. model of
granting federal judges with life tenure is not dramatically differ-
ent from the current Israeli model that grants such tenure until
mandatory retirement at the age of seventy.7y Under both mod-
Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1787 (2005). While it is diffi-
cult to fully support Wechsler's plea for neutral principles, it is nonetheless interesting
to see that judges still search for such a stance. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). Such debates are not
limited to the U.S. context. See Ariel Bendor, Investigating the Executive Branch in Israel
and in the United States: Politics as Law, the Politics of Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 193 (2000).
68. President Aharon Barak considers judicial objectivity a precondition to realiz-
ing the proper judicial role. See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REV. 19, 56 (2002) ("The judge must realize his or
her role in a democracy impartially and objectively .... The purpose of objectivity is
not to sever the judge from his environment. Rather, its purpose is to allow him to
ascertain properly the fundamental principles of his time."). For a foundational discus-
sion of the triadic role of the judge as an umpire see generally MARTIN SHAPIRO,
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYsis (1981).
69. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), a statute empow-
ering a state to charge a demonstration fee proportional to the security costs was de-
clared by the Court to be content-based and therefore unconstitutional. If we give the
government the benefit of the doubt, this could be seen as an example of the tendency
of the government to err for the side of achieving what it perceives as an important
state interest, namely the judicious management of the public coffers. For a justifica-
tion of viewpoint discrimination, see Cass R. Sunstein, Half Truths ofthe First Amendment,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 26-27 (1993).
70. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, 1984, S.H. 78 (outlining the legal mandates of
the judiciary).
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els, judges are relatively insulated from party politics. 7 How-
ever, the lower procedural safeguards against amending the Ba-
sic Law: The Judiciary, which guaranties judicial independence
and prescribes the appointment procedures, may place the Is-
raeli Court in a weaker position.7 2 A weaker Court might find it
easier to protect human dignity than freedom of expression:
The latter has adversity built into it, whereas the former is pre-
mised on inclusion. Freedom of expression is guaranteed in or-
der to allow for an adversarial exchange of ideas; it is protected
because the assumption is that the speech will need the protec-
tion on account of its offensive nature. A court striking down
legislation that curtails speech is, in a sense, acting to foster disa-
greement. It takes a fairly insular court to be able to withstand
the political pressures that would accuse the court of fomenting,
71. An argument could be made that the Israeli system achieves greater insularity,
since the appointment mechanism in Israel does not vest the power of appointment
solely in the elected branches. Rather, judges are appointed by the President of the
State upon election by a judges' election committee. The Israeli president is not
elected but appointed by the Knesset, since the position is primarily ceremonial, often
awarded to a retired politician. More importantly, the judges' election committee is a
nine member body comprised of representatives of the court, the bar, the Knesset and
the government, so that the politicians (two members of the Knesset and two members
of the government) are outnumbered by the profession (three judges and two mem-
bers of the bar). See id.
72. On the other hand, the Israeli legislature has greater powers to amend the
Israeli constitution in response to judicial interpretation. This allows the Court to act
more freely, since it knows the legislature may still enjoy the last word. The Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty is not entrenched at all, and theoretically the Knesset may
amend the law by a simple majority of two members to one. However, this Basic Law
was amended in 1994 together with the amendment of Basic Law: Freedom of Voca-
tion, which requires a majority of sixty one of the Knesset's 120 members for its amend-
ment. This suggests that those parts of the law that were amended in 1994 can be
amended now only with the majority of the house, not only the majority of those taking
part in the vote. In any event, it is assumed that (as in other parliamentary systems) the
government enjoys the support of the parliament (namely sixty one members), and
thus may amend the law if it sees fit. However, as a matter of political reality, the Knes-
set is rather reluctant to amend the Basic Laws, which it sees as forming the foundation
for a fully fledged and comprehensive constitution Israel will once have. While the
independence of the judiciary is granted in both systems, the different structure gov-
erning the separation of powers suggests that Israeli judges who wish to avoid their
decisions overturned by the legislature would pay closer heed to the legislative position
on point. CompareJEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REvISITED 4-17 (2002) (arguing that the attitudinal model of deci-
sion-making provides a more realistic tool for explaining and predicting the Supreme
Court's decisions), with William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick:
Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8
J.L. ECON. ORG. 165, 165-89 (1992) (offering a game theoretic analysis to demonstrate
the political dynamics of lawmaking).
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or at least not containing, social clashes. Human dignity, on the
other hand, rests on the opposite logic. It seeks not adversity,
but accommodation. A court striking down legislation that vio-
lates the right to human dignity therefore protects a different
version of pluralism-one based on securing a sense of belong-
ing and care. It seems that it would be more difficult for a legis-
lature to mobilize political support to retaliate against a court
that seeks greater care for the members of the polity.
Insularity from popular processes, of course, has its risks.
Some have suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court is too insu-
lar.73 However, if viewed through long-range lenses-lenses that
track judicial performance over longer periods of time-the lack
of direct popular reaffirmation of the judicial determinations
serves as a check on judicial discretion, thereby mitigating the
dangers of greater insularity."4 The legitimacy of the judiciary as
a whole stands to suffer in the long run if judges exercise their
restrictive powers in a manner perceived unreasonable and if
their decisions consistently and substantially hinder the achieve-
ment of compelling governmental goals.75 If this analysis is cor-
rect, judges may, on occasion, decide not to exercise judicial re-
view, but rather exercise self-censorship (in the form of judicial
restraint) if the expected public outcry might seriously under-
mine their social capital.76
In any event, in light of the typical institutional biases dis-
cussed above, it would make sense to place the protection of
speech-whether as an "elevated" right or as a right subservient
to human dignity-at the constitutional level and in the hands
73. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICAL REVIEW (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000).
74. See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW COURTS
SERVE AMERICA (2006).
75. Aharon Barak considers maintaining public confidence in the judiciary as one
of the preconditions for realizing the judicial role. This does not mean that the judicial
branch is accountable to the public as is the legislature, but it does mean that one of
the boundaries of the judicial power is society's basic conventions. See Barak, supra note
64, at 53-62; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 123-27
(1980) ("Whether and to what degree the Justices, individually or collectively, are
guided by perceived public attitudes is at least as complex a psycho-empirical problem
as whether their constitutional interpretations are 'right' as a doctrinal matter.").
76. See CHOPER, supra note 75; SAMUEL KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLIT-
ICAL PROCESS 104-33 (1965).
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of judges, since such an institutional design would address some
of the concerns that may arise out of the representative
processes of governance. Nonetheless, the judiciary will inevita-
bly have its own institutional biases. First, as mentioned earlier,
judges may fail to act if the stakes are too high. For example, if
riots are on the horizon (or have actually taken place), speech-
as other individual rights-may suddenly receive a colder shoul-
der.7 7 Second, judges are less likely to protect speech that stands
to undercut the social capital of courts. Thus judges (in Israel
and in the United States) will be sensitive to speech that may
appear to interfere with the processes of adjudication. Judicial
determinations regarding issues such as secrecy of jury delibera-
tion,7" television cameras in courtrooms 79 and journalistic privi-
lege of sources, ° generate inherent conflicts of interest.
It seems that while some variations of institutional design
exist between the U.S. judiciary and its Israeli counterpart, these
variations are relatively minor. Over all, recognizing the insular-
ity of judges highlights the similarity between the two models
rather than the differences.
IV. COURTS, CITIZENS, STATE AND SPEECH
The distinction between the two systems comes into sharper
focus when the institutional design is placed in a social context.
The U.S. approach assumes some degree of adversity between
citizen and state: While the three branches of government are
there to govern on behalf of the people, the state is a source of
concern for the individual. The leviathan is dangerous and it is
natural and desirable that the people should distrust the exer-
cise of power by its agents (as these agents may have an interest
in broadening and consolidating power).8
77. See Kenneth Lasson, Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the Limits of Free Speech
and Religious Liberty, 27 WHrrr-ER L. REV. 3, 54-58 (2005).
78. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Juiy Independence, 41 AM.
CRiM. L. REV. 1 (2004) (suggesting that the independence of the jury is a fiction which
is maintained by the court because it allows the court to reach desirable results).
79. See William Wagner, Justice in the Spotlight, 21 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 337, 367-71
(2004).
80. See generally Karl H. Schmid, Journalistic Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An
Analysis of United States Courts of Appeal's Decisions from 1973-1999, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
1441 (2002). The writer's conclusion is that whether intentionally or not, the outcome
of the courts' approach is biased in favor of the government.
81. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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This adversarial position is not necessarily shared in most
common law democracies. The notion of responsible govern-
ment-that we should trust the government (or its three
branches) to carry out the public mandate granted to it-is
rather prevalent in countries such as Canada. 2 The idea that
representatives can be trusted to protect the rights and interests
of their constituencies was often raised as an argument against
the necessity of enacting a constitutional bill of rights,83 and
when one was adopted in Canada it was not a result of a crisis in
the protection of human rights, but rather as a vehicle to estab-
lish common identity upon which all Canadians could unite.84
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms-which en-
shrines all rights except, interestingly, property rightsS5-was not
taken by the courts as necessarily establishing adversity between
the government and the citizenry, but as reinforcing the basic
structure of responsible government, including the fiduciary
duty officials owe the public.86 Under this design, speech does
not enjoy any a priori advantage over other rights, including the
freedom from emotional harm.8" There is no reason to assume
82. While there is no formal basis for the principle of responsible government in
the Canadian system, it is understood that the government is both responsive and re-
sponsible to the people. For a discussion of "responsible government" in Canada at the
time the Charter was adopted, see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA
189-213 (2d ed. 1985). It has also been argued that parliamentary systems, such as
Canada's system, which evolved without "American-style judicial review," value "collec-
tive self-government" above all else. See Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can
New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L.
REv. 1963, 1963-64 (2004).
83. See MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLIT-
ICS IN CANADA 39-46 (1994).
84. See generally ALAN C. CAIRNS, CHARTER VERSUS FEDERALISM: THE DILEMMAS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1992); Richard Gwyn, Trudeau: The Idea of Canadianism, in
TRUDEAU'S SHADOW (A. Cohen &J.L. Granatstein eds., 1998); see also HOGG, supra note
82 (reviewing the various means through which rights were protected in Canada prior
to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982).
85. Property rights are protected both in the U.S. Constitution and in the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights (a Canadian statute that preceded the Constitutional Charter).
These instruments predate the drafting of the Canadian Charter and, therefore, it is
clear that the omission of property from the Charter was a deliberate act. See HOGG,
supra note 82, at 745-46.
86. See MANDEL, supra note 83, at 60-68. In a recent article Professor Hiebert con-
trasts the Canadian parliamentary model with the American constitutional model and
argues that the Canadian model allows a "broader spectrum of institutional actors" to
review legislation in conflict with fundamental rights. See Hiebert, supra note 82, at
1979-80.
87. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.). The Court in
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that the government can be trusted less with regulating speech
compared to the trust it enjoys in regulating other matters, in-
cluding matters affecting liberty and equality.
In this respect, the situation in Israel is even more complex.
The Jewish people vied for sovereignty for years.88 The establish-
ment of the State of Israel, as a national home for the Jewish
people, creates a special relationship between the community
and the State: It represents the affirmation of dreams and aspi-
rations rather than a dangerous Leviathan.89 Approached from
this angle, Israel is more Canadian than Canada. Nevertheless,
for centuries Jews have learned to view the idea of government-
the official branches of the state-as something that ultimately
may be captured by forces that would harm the Jewish people.9"
Jews have insisted on maintaining social structures that are sepa-
this case states that reputation and free speech are twin values that have to be balanced.
Roy Leeper claims that the differences between the U.S and the Canadian approaches
to hate speech originate in the difference between the American liberal worldview and
the Canadian communitarian worldview. These are reflected in the consideration of
the effect of hate speech on the targeted group and on the society as a whole in Ca-
nada, while the U.S Supreme Court focuses on the damage caused to the speaker by
regulating speech. See Roy Leeper, Keegstra and R.A.V.: A Comparative Analysis of the
Canadian and U.S. Approaches to Hate Speech Legislation, 5 COMM. L & POL'Y 295, 295-313
(2000). Michel Rosenfeld places the source of the differences in the different ap-
proaches to dealing with multiculturalism and multiethnicism: While the United States
has embraced an assimilationalist ideal symbolized by the metaphor of the "melting
pot," Canada has placed greater emphasis on cultural diversity and has promoted the
ideal of an "ethnic mosaic." See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurispru-
dence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARnozo L. REV. 1523, 1542 (2003).
88. According to the Jewish tradition, even when the early Israelites were enslaved
in Egypt, the promised land was a major source of hope and aspiration. See MICHAEL
WALZER, ExoDus AND REVOLUTION 101 (1985). The State of Israel constitutes a form of
secular and religious redemption for the Jewish people. See THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRA-
DITION 465 (Michael Walzer, Menachem Loberbaum & Noam J. Zohar eds., 2000).
89. This notion is well demonstrated in the declaration of independence that em-
phasizes the historical bond between the Jewish people and Israel, and calls the Jewish
Diaspora to join the historical act of building a Jewish nation. See The Declaration of
the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.), available at http://www.
mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the %20Peace %20Process/Decla-
ration %20of%2OEstablishment%20of%2OState%20of%2Olsrael.
90. Fear and objection toward authority is a central motive of the Jewish Diaspora
folklore. See the story "Hadrasha" about the Jewish history, HAzAz HAIM, HADRASHA
AND OTHER STORIES 127 (1991). See generally EHUD SPRINZAK, EVERY MAN WHATSOEVER IS
RIGHT IN His OWN EYES: ILLEGALISM IN ISRAELI SOCIETY (2d ed. 1987). Sprinzak claims
that historical and cultural origins constructed the phenomena that he describes as an
instrumental attitude towards law and basic disrespect to the idea of legalism as a basic
value of democracy.
100 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
rate from the state, and are often at odds with the state."' The
Israeli Court must therefore steer a course between the attitude
that the state is the manifestation of peoplehood (and thus can-
not be viewed as "the enemy"), and on the other hand the rem-
nants of diasporaic attitudes reflecting the culture of collective
autonomy from the law and hints of illegalism (or disrespect to
civil authority)92 The ambivalent attitude in Israel toward law as
"our" norms and law as "their" decrees thus adds a layer of com-
plexity to the justifications the Court needs to provide for its
doctrine and intervention.
The Court's early decision, in 1953, to adopt the U.S. model
regarding the centrality of speech in the famous Kol Ha'am
case9" is regarded today as a watershed mark, allowing for strict
review of executive discretion that affects freedom of expression.94
The Court thus assumed the position of the guardian of democ-
racy vis-A-vis the bureaucrats, including the (elected) ministers,
on behalf of the legislature.95 The Court adopted an interpreta-
tive presumption according to which the legislation, pursuant to
which the executive agency operates, should be read to provide
greater, rather than lesser, protection to basic democratic
rights.96 During Israel's formative years, the Court was reluctant
to enter the thicket of constitutional judicial review over primary
legislation, including when matters of speech were at stake. 97 It
91. This ambivalence toward the authorities is demonstrated by the attitude of the
Religious Zionist Movement toward the Supreme Court. See Yisrael Katzover, Who Broke
the Rules, HA'ARETZ (lsr.), Aug. 30, 1996; Beni La'o, A Pragmatic Leadership Needed,
HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 14, 1999.
92. For example, see the contrasting opinions expressed by Justices Zamir and
Cheshin in HCJ 164/97 Conterm Ltd. v. Ministry of Fin., Department of Customs and VAT
[1998] IsrSC 52(1) 289, 320-21, 365-57, regarding the desirable relationship between
the State and the individual, and especially the duty of honesty owed by the individual
toward the State.
93. HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Interior [1953] lsrSC 7 871, 876-
78.
94. See A.E. Shapiro, Self-Restraint of the Supreme Court and the Preservation of Civil
Liberties, 3 TEL Aviv U. L. Rv. 640, 646-49 (1973).
95. With a notable but very limited exception in matters of elections, interpreting
section four to the Basic Law: Knesset is exemplified in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister
of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693. Yet even this narrow exception was not taken as
resting on a superior, constitutional norm, only on a procedural entrenchment of that
Basic Law, which required that acts infringing upon the equality of elections be passed
by sixty one members of the Knesset. And indeed, pursuant to cases where the Court
found such infringement, the Knesset re-enacted the law with the required majority.
96. See HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transp. [1981] IsrSC 37(3) 337, 356-58.
97. Justice Barak explains in HCJ 142/89 Lao'r Movement v. Chairmen of the Knesset
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insisted on the British model of parliamentary sovereignty,
under which the legislature is immune from judicial review but
the executive is subjected to exacting review regarding the vires
(and, in Israel, the reasonableness°S). This allowed the Court to
act as an agent of the people (representing "our laws") against
the administration (and "their decrees").
As mentioned, in 1995 the Court found that the adoption of
the Basic Laws in 1992"9 (and their amendment in 1994) altered
the constitutional landscape by granting the judiciary the power
to exercise constitutional judicial review over primary legisla-
tion.100 It should be noted that the elected branches view the
constitutional revolution as primarily court-made-or, in the
words of the Chair of the Constitution Committee of the Knes-
set, a "unilateral move" by the Court. l' l It therefore remains to
be seen whether the era of constitutional judicial review in Israel
will allow the Court to retain the dual position as an organ of the
dual state that nonetheless remains somewhat detached from
the State. 10 2 Given the lack of express and unequivocal empow-
erment by the people or their representatives-and given the
political reaction to the recentjudicial move-it appears that the
Israeli Court will find it difficult to act in a truly counter-
[1990] IsrSC 44(3) 529, 554, that the Israeli Court has the authority to invalidate a law
in which content severely harms the basic values of the system, yetJustice Barak claims
that using this authority will not fit the conventions of the Israeli public, and therefore
should not be exercised by the Court at the time being.
98. The Israeli Court applies the "margin of reasonableness" with which to evalu-
ate the exercise of administrative discretion. The doctrine would invalidate grossly or
patently unreasonable decisions. See HCJ 389/80 Dapey Zahav (Yellow Pages) v. Israeli
Broad. Auth. [19811 IsrSC 35(1) 421.
99. See generally Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1994, S.H. 90; Basic Law:
Freedom of Vocation, 1994, S.H. 90.
100. In CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995]
IsrSC 49(4) 221, the Court was divided regarding the source of the Knesset's authority
to establish a constitution; nevertheless, the majority of the Court agreed that the new
Basic Laws provided the Court the power to exercise judicial review.
101. See Gideon Alon, For-But Not By-The People, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Dec. 3, 2006
(quoting Michael Eitan, Chairman of the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Com-
mittee, as stating that he believes the Knesset should "complete legislation of the Basic
Laws" as opposed to "writ[ing] a constitution in a random manner, through the hand-
ing down of binding decrees and verdicts.").
102. For a general discussion of the institutional aspects of the constitutional
revolution, see generally Zeev Segal, Judicial Review of Statutes - Who Has the Authority to
Declare a Law Unconstitutional?, 28(1) MISHPATiM 239 (1997). Andrei Marmor claims
that there is no theoretical justification for adopting the U.S. model in Israel. See Andrei
Marmor, Judicial Review in Israel, 4(1) MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 133, 159 (1997).
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majoritarian way. While the Court was a fierce gatekeeper
against the executive, the effective protection it may provide
against offensive parliamentary legislation remains to be seen.
The institutional design of speech protection is complicated
for yet another reason: The decisions of the Court are in them-
selves also speech. The Courts' speech (about speech) is an es-
sential component in the formation of the national ethos. As
professor Weiler convincingly argued in the European context,
judicial performance plays an important element in generating
spheres of belonging." 3 While the Court's opinions inevitably
address the aforementioned tension between responsible gov-
ernment and limited government, its main ethos-building thrust
relates to the formation of membership in the community (and
what this membership entails). Decisions about speech are par-
ticularly significant, in light of the aforementioned relationship
between voice and membership. In deciding matters of hate
speech, such as the Suszkin case, the Court is engaged not only in
maneuvering between "our law" and "their decrees" but also be-
tween "us" and "them." In legal disputes over what constitutes
hate speech and whether such speech is nonetheless protected,
it is often the case that the Court informs us that hate should not
be expressed at "them," because they are in fact (the Court ar-
gues) part of "us."1 4 By making pronouncements on what it
means to be a member of the Israeli community-and what
rights and obligations come along with that membership-the
Court thus impacts Israel's delicate politics of identity. In the
Suszkin case it was important for the Court to highlight that Mus-
lims deserve the equal protection of the Israeli law, and the fact
that Hebron is not part of Israel does not lessen the degree of
protection its residents deserve from Israeli authorities. The
Court was careful not to "annex" Hebron to Israel, and at the
same time, it accorded its residents the protection accorded to
Israeli residents. By treating the value underlying the offense-
103. SeeJ. H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES
HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 188-207, 324-35
(1999).
104. For an illuminating analysis see Martha Minow, Regulating Hatred: Whose
Speech, Whose Crimes, Whose Power? - An Essay for Kenneth Karst, 47 UCLA L. Rv. 1253
(1990); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH L. Rv. 2320, 2345-48 (1989). Matsuda says that the prohibition should
guarantee that the minority can equally participate in public discourse.
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human dignity-as an element of equal membership in a com-
munity of moral agents, the Court sidestepped legal and political
mines as it further developed a vision of Israeli identity.' °5
However, the Court's evocative power is not unlimited.
Since Israelis have yet to reach a shared understanding of the
nature of the state (Jewish and/or Democratic), the Court's pro-
nouncements regarding who, We, the People, are (what we
stand for and what duties we owe our fellow citizens) stand to
offend some and appear to others as illegitimate ventures into
the sphere best left to political parties and the general popu-
lace.106
V. BALANCING WORDS
The third point that differentiates U.S. and Israeli ap-
proaches to speech in general (and to speech that inflicts harm
upon religious sensitivities in particular) is a doctrinal point.
Whereas in the United States the notion of balancing freedom
of expression with other rights has met with notable opposi-
tion, °7 judges and scholars in Israel have wholeheartedly em-
braced this balancing methodology. 08 Understanding the U.S.
doctrine of freedom of expression requires recognition of the
105. The educational role of the Court has long been recognized. See, e.g., Ralph
Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 127 (1967);
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
961 (1992). In the context of hate speech, Martha Minow argues that education might
be more effective than regulation. See Martha Minow, Education For Co-Existence, 44 AIz.
L. REv. 1 (2002); Martha Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARDOZO L. REv.
1393 (1990). While Minow refers specifically to expressions of hate in institutions (such
as universities), her claim applies more broadly, and has implications regarding the
constitutive function of the Court.
106. For a discussion of how Israel has struggled with the challenge of defining
itself as both "the State of the Jewish people" and an "egalitarian democracy," see Aeyal
M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and TransitionalJustice: Lessons from South Africa
and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47, 65-67 (2004).
107. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
LJ. 943, 997-1002 (1987) (noting that the Court must recognize problems associated
with balancing). The most prominent opponent in the U.S. Supreme Court wasJustice
Black. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-20 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 865-71 (1960).
108. In HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Southern District Police Commander [1984] IsrSC 38(2)
393, 400, Justice Barak says that balancing is recognized in the Israeli law as an expres-
sion of the non-absolute status of rights. See Eyal Benvenisti, Regulating Speech in a Di-
vided Society, 30(1) MISHPATIM 29 (1999) (advocating broad standards of acceptable
speech as opposed to specific rules which would not be fairly adaptable to each of
Israel's subcultures).
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line of jurisprudence that rejects balancing as methodologically
unviable and instrumentally detrimental to speech. While in
most cases this approach was not embraced-and today in most
cases the U.S. courts use the language of balancing-the warn-
ing words of the "absolutists" still reverberate, and their influ-
ence on First Amendment culture cannot be ignored.'0 9
Moreover, what is couched in a language of "balancing," is
often applied in a manner that is not. Many of the "balancing"
doctrines predetermine the resulting outcome" 0 and thus, for
practical purposes, judicial discretion is constrained and di-
rected primarily to evidentiary matters.'" This is most evident
where the doctrine requires courts to examine the state's con-
tention that the suppression of speech should be upheld be-
cause the speech undercuts a compelling state interest and the
means deployed to curtail the harmful speech were narrowly tai-
lored to protect this interest. 12 While it could be argued that
109. While the U.S. Supreme Court keeps reiterating that freedom of speech is not
absolute, the warning words of Justice Black appear in all the main First Amendment
casebooks. It thus stands to reason that most U.S. jurists engaged in First Amendment
jurisprudence are well aware of the deficiencies and limits of balancing in the context
of freedom of expression. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. See, for example, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315-21 (1988), where the Court
analyzed a regulation of displays that "bring into public odium any foreign government
... within 500 feet" of its embassy as content-based. "Our cases indicate that as a content-
based restriction on political speech in a public forum, [the law] must be subjected to the
most exacting scrutiny. Thus, we have required the State to show that the 'regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.'" Id. at 321 (emphasis in original). Such a test almost always results in the
invalidation of the violating provision.
111. For example, in the context of advocacy for the commission of a crime, see
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (invalidating a statute that punished
speech advocating violence because it was not shown that the speech would cause immi-
nent harm). Despite the spotted history of the Court in protecting communist speech,
compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957), it seems that today the standard of evidence the Court would require would
be rather high. Compare New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(noting that the government had not met the heavy burden of proving the necessity of
a prior restraint on the publication of the Pentagon Papers), with United States v. Pro-
gressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (holding that the restriction on
the publication of nuclear secrets is within the exception to the ban on prior restraint
of a publication).
112. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 315-2; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62
(1980). In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply cir-
cumscribed. In such quintessential public fora, for the State to enforce a content-based
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See id. at 461-62.
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implicit in this doctrine is the relative "weight" of the state inter-
est and the value of free speech, in fact the doctrine is set and
applied so that only in limited circumstances will the court find
that the state interest is compelling enough and that the means
used by the state are narrowly tailored enough to ensure no inci-
dental overburdening of speech.' In other words, in cases
where the state interest is content-sensitive (and a-fortiorari view-
point sensitive), the doctrine, as applied by the court, is quite
restrictive. Such balancing is very different from an open-ended
assessment of whether the overall harm expected to befall upon
society (and its values) if the speech is not suppressed is greater,
on balance, than the harm that would be caused as a result of
suppressing the speech.
In Israel, the restrictive exercise of heightened scrutiny is
referred to as "vertical" balancing." 4 Its "engineering" is rather
straightforward: The core value (weight) of the state interest is
placed "above" the core value (weight) of the right. Therefore,
when the right and the state interest collide, the state interest
will prevail (having a "weightier" value). National security, for
example, is of greater value to society than the freedom of ex-
pression of an individual who wishes to disclose the names of
secret agents. However, placing the state interest "above" the in-
dividual right is somewhat misleading. Since the harm almost
always is expected to happen in the future, the court must deter-
mine the likelihood that the harm will in fact accrue if the right
is not infringed, i.e. if the publication of the speech is allowed.
Following Hand's formulation," 5 as the danger posed by the
113. For rare examples of statutes surviving strict scrutiny, see Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992), where a state statute imposing 100-foot boundary restriction
on distribution of campaign materials on election day was found constitutional under a
strict scrutiny analysis. The statute constituted a compromise between competing fun-
damental rights. See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990) (upholding limits on corporate donations to political candidates because of the
compelling government interest in preventing corruption).
114. The Israeli Court applies the vertical test whenever there is a clash between
achieving a compelling governmental interest and protecting a human right. This tech-
nique is not restricted to expression. For example, in HCJ 448/85 Daher v. Minister of
the Interior [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 701, the clash was between the interest of public safety
and the freedom of movement.
115. CircuitJudge Learned Hand (as he was then), in Dennis v. United States, states:
"In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
183 F.2d 201, 212, aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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speech increases (i.e., as weightier state interests are
threatened), the probability standard the state must meet de-
creases. A danger of a very serious harm requires a lesser show-
ing that the harm will in fact materialize in order to allow the
state to suppress the speech. If the harm is not colossal, the state
must demonstrate with near certainty that the speech will cause
the predicted harm before it may suppress the speech. In prac-
tice, very few utterances may bring colossal harm and therefore
the court expects the government to demonstrate that it is
nearly certain that the harm will in fact come about if the speech
is left un-proscribed." 6 That almost always means that freedom
of speech will prevail, since it is quite difficult for the govern-
ment to meet that standard (in part because almost always other
means are available for the state in order to foil the harm).
While the court's language invokes the term "balancing," the
court is engaged in a more formal doctrine precisely because it
insists on both a compelling state interest and on demonstrating
the high likelihood that it will be seriously harmed by the
speech. The court does not really "balance" the interest versus
speech; itjust ensures that the interest is indeed compelling, and
a strict deliberative standard is met, that is, that the government
meets an exacting standard of proof before speech is sup-
pressed." 7 As mentioned, in most cases, such standards cannot
be met. Such a judicial approach, then, may be balancing in
name only.
A different kind of balancing is what the Israeli Court calls
"horizontal" balancing:' Resolving the clash between two
rights by way of "weighing" the importance of each right (i.e.,
the value it protects) and by measuring how much of each right
is being infringed by the state action. This judicial equation
should lead the Court to determine the equilibrium point be-
116. The demand to prove the near certainty of a substantial and imminent danger to
the public interest was first used in HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of the Interior
[1953] IsrSC 7 871 (emphasis added). In that case the Minister of Interior failed to
prove that public safety was most likely to be substantially impaired if the publication of
two communist daily newspapers was not halted.
117. In the words ofJustice Dorner: "The vertical balance-implemented when a
contradiction occurs between a human right and a public interest-is designed to mini-
mize as possible the damage to the right even when it is outweighed by the interest."
HCJ 1514/01 Gur-Aryeh v. T.V. & Radio Second Auth. [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 267, 284.
118. See HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Jerusalem Dist. Comm'r [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456,
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tween the two clashing rights."'9 This is indeed true balancing,
since the Court is seeking a "margin of accommodation" for
both rights, a "compromise" between the two rights120 that re-
flects their exact weight under the circumstances. Despite the
scientific precision the test implies, it is not clear whether the
Court's balancing acts can be effectively measured and evalu-
ated, given the lack of established methodology (namely, scales)
with which rights can be "balanced." 12' All in all, horizontal bal-
ancing risks the obvious critique of ad-hoc, result-oriented deci-
sion-making. 12
2
The lines between vertical and horizontal balancing in
Israel are sometimes blurred, depending on whether the Court
phrases the matter as a clash between rights or a clash between a
right and a state interest. For example, in dealing with restrict-
ing reports from judicial proceedings, the Court could be bal-
ancing a right (freedom of expression) versus a state interest
(maintaining confidence in the judicial process), or a right
(freedom of expression) versus a right (the right to a fair trial).
The line-blurring problem is further apparent when we examine
the probability standard the state must meet before the speech is
infringed. Rather than applying the exacting test associated with
119. Justice Dorner says in Gur-Aryeh, IsrSC 55(4) at 285, that "the purpose of the
horizontal balance is to minimize the infringement of both rights" by allowing a mini-
mal infringement of each right by the other. "If the co-existence isn't possible, the
right that will outweigh the other is the one that the consequence of its infringement
inflicts greater harm for the individual."
120. Compare, in the U.S. context, the conflicting rights of "the right to engage in
political discourse" with "the right to vote." See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198
(1992).
121. See Michael D. Birnhack, Constitutional Geometry: The Methodology of the Supreme
Court in Reaching Value Judgments, 19(2) BAR-hAN L. STUD. 591, 603 (2003) (noting that
the balancing tests may not necessarily lead to a definite conclusion); see also Aleinikoff,
supra note 107, at 974-76 (discussing the problem of formulating a "common scale" for
balancing rights).
122. Such critique is not unique to Israel. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994), it appears the U.S. Supreme Court was engaged in a similar
exercise, rousing Justice Scalia's scathing critique. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Today the ad hoc nullification machine claims its latest, greatest, and
most surprising victim: the First Amendment."). Madsen, it seems, could have been
decided even under strict scrutiny, given the lack of options to ensure women rights for
safe abortions, yet the Court insisted on framing the issue as a content neutral time,
place, and manner regulation. The Court applied a standard of review that was less
stringent than strict scrutiny but more exacting than intermediate scrutiny, requiring a
"significant government interest" and infringing on a right to "no more speech than
necessary." See id. at 765.
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vertical balancing (i.e., that the speech will "almost certainly"
harm the public confidence in the judiciary), in some cases the
Court demands only that the state shows the speech "is likely" to
cause a certain harm. 123 By blurring the lines between rights
and public interests, the Court, in effect, is conducting a varia-
tion of a horizontal balancing: It determines the weight of the
state interest (or the right of the individual) vis-A-vis the weight
of speech, so as to find a "compromise" as to how much speech
(and under what conditions) should be allowed to stand and
how much of the governmental interest (and under what condi-
tions) should be allowed to suffer. Such balancing, it seems, is a
matter of pure assessment, and is susceptible to the institutional
biases outlined in the previous sections.
Armed with these doctrinal tools, it is worthwhile to ex-
amine the Court's decision in the Suszkin case. The Court in-
quired what should be the relationship between the speech at
hand and the harm sought to avoid. Ms. Suszkin was not
charged with violating an ordinary "breach of the peace" of-
fense, and thus the Court was not required to examine whether
her expressive conduct would bring about riots and whether
such riots, under the circumstances, would not be a form of a
heckler's veto.' 2 4 Rather, the harm the specific offense is set to
123. See CrimA 126/62 Dissenchick v. Attorney Gen. [1963] IsrSC 17(1) 169, 180;
ACA 4708/03 Lili Chen v. Israel [2005] (unpublished); CrimA 696/81 Azoulay v. Israel
[1983] lsrSC 37(2) 565. Compare with the explicit requirement by the Canadian Court
for a "real and substantial risk of trial unfairness" as justification for a publication ban
concerning judicial proceedings. Deganis v. Canadian Broad. [1994] 3 S.C.R 835, 880
(Can.). This approach mainly stems from the Canadian judiciary's view that publicizing
court proceedings is essential in ensuring judicial fairness and legitimacy. See D.
Stepniak, A Comparative Analysis of First Amendment Rights and the Televising of Court Pro-
ceedings, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 315, 336 (2004). Canadian courts also consider publicity of
judicial proceedings in criminal matters as a price that the "accused must pay in the
interests of ensuring the accountability of those engaged in the administration ofjus-
tice." Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671, 32, 64 C.C.C. (3d)
65, 68 (Can.).
124. Compare to HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v.Jerusalem District Commissioner [1994] lsrSC
48(2) 456, HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Southern District Commissioner [1988] IsrSC 38(2) 393, and
HCJ 148/79 Sa'ar v. Minister of the Interior [1980] isrSC 34(2) 169, all addressing, di-
rectly or indirectly, whether opposition from the possible audience is a legitimate con-
cern for not providing a permit for a demonstration. Compare, in the United States, to
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (invalidating a county ordi-
nance that allowed for a varying level of fees to be assessed based on the expected
amount of security necessary for the county to provide during a parade). Perhaps the
most famous U.S. case on point concerns the Skokie affair, dealing with the rights of
Neo-Nazis to march in the streets of the village of Skokie, where the majority of the
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prevent is the harm to religious feelings. 125 Recall that under
standard "balancing" doctrine, the harm caused by the speech
needs to be balanced against the harm caused by suppressing
speech. But how can we determine the net present value of the
harm that might be caused by the speech? Such harm is "calcu-
lated" by multiplying the "weight" (or "importance") of the gov-
ernmental interest-i.e., the interest that stands to suffer injury
if the speech is not proscribed-and the probability that such
speech will indeed cause such an impingement. 26 Note that this
should be a vertical balancing, between a right (freedom of
speech) and a governmental interest (avoiding harm to religious
sentiments). The Court wondered whether the prosecution
should show that it is nearly certain that the speech will cause
such harm, or whether the prosecution should show only that it
is probable, or highly probable, but not necessarily nearly cer-
tain, that upon publication religious sentiments will be hurt.127
The answer to that question depends on the relative weight (or
importance) of the governmental interest. 128 What is the weight
of religious sentiments? In Israel-perhaps in all democracies,
but certainly in Israel-that may be a hard question to answer.12
population wasJewish (and among which many had relatives who perished in the Holo-
caust). See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (1978), affd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)
(enjoining the town from preventing public assembly objected to on grounds of the
racist objectives of the marching group).
125. Recall that Ms. Suszkin was convicted for violating § 173(a)(1) of the penal
code, which criminalizes publication that has the potential to severely harm the beliefs
or the religious feelings of others on the penalty of up to one year in prison. The Court
had to determine the meaning of "hurting religious feelings." The answer, based on an
article by Daniel Statman, Hurting Religious Feelings, in MULTICULTURALISM IN A JEWISH
AND DEMOCRATIC STATE 133 (M. Ma'utner, A. Sagi & R. Shamir eds., 1998), was that
"one hurts another person's religious feelings when his behavior causes anger, frustra-
tion, insult, etc., and these feelings were not stirred hadn't the other person been relig-
ious."
126. See HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Jerusalem Dist. Comm'r [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456,
475.
127. See CrimA 697/98 Suszkin v. Israel [1998] lsrSC 52(3) 289.
128. For example, publishing a list of undercover secret agents in a local newspa-
per may result, should this information get into the wrong hands, in endangering their
lives and in endangering national security, two rather hefty values. It is therefore not
necessary to demonstrate that it is nearly certain that releasing this information will in
fact reach the enemy, only that it is probable.
129. For a discussion of the theoretical problems associated with favoring free ex-
pression over religious expression in the United States, see Stephen M. Feldman, The
Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does The Supreme Court Favor Free
Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 431, 456 (2006). These theoreti-
cal problems would likely be more pronounced in Israel. For a creative attempt to
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In order to determine the proper balancing in Suszkin, the
Court turned to a neighboring offense-sedition. The Court
found that the value at the core of sedition-the protection of a
legitimate government against rebellion-is more important
than the value at the core of the offense in Suszkin (ensuring that
religious sentiments are not hurt as part of maintaining public
order).' 3 ° In proving a sedition case, the prosecution, as a mat-
ter of established law in Israel, needs only to demonstrate that a
certain speech will "probably" incite people (i.e., that there is
"substantial likelihood")." The Court suggested that since the
value at the core of inflicting harm on religious sentiments is less
weighty, the prosecution will need to establish a higher degree
of probability that such harm will indeed result on account of
the speech being spoken.132 This conclusion points toward
adopting the "near certainty" standard in cases such as Suszkin.
On the other hand, the Court noted that the offense at
hand-afflicting harm on religious sentiments-is regulated
through a "subsequent punishment" (and not a "prior re-
straint") regime. Influenced by U.S.jurisprudence, 3' the Court
views "prior restraint" regimes with greater suspicion, and there-
fore the demands placed on the state in such cases is the strict-
est, namely to show "near certainty." "Subsequent punishment"
regimes, in contrast, do not mandate the strictest standard.'
The fact that inflicting harm on religious sentiments is pro-
scribed solely by way of subsequent punishment should point,
under the Court's analysis, towards adopting the "substantial
untangle the Gordic Knot, see generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007).
130. See Suszkin, IsrSC 52(3) at 307. Although it is not considered an interest of
the highest importance, the Court emphasizes the significance of tolerance for the sta-
bility of a diverse democratic State like Israel.
131. Penal Law, s.134, 5737-1977, Hok ha-'onashin 52 (Isr.), makes it a crime, pun-
ishable by up to five years in prison, to publish a statement that may bring about sedi-
tion.
132. Suszkin, IsrSC 52(3) at 306-07. This approach, according to Justice Or, seeks
to maximize the protection of freedom of speech, whereas a lower standard raises the
concern that expression might be criminalized without real justification.
133. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
134. Id. Subsequent punishment limits the expression but doesn't prevent it to-
tally; the damage caused to the freedom of expression is considered by the Court as less
severe. See Fiss, supra note 61, at 130. Needless to say, in practice, subsequent punish-
ment can be as chilling as prior restraint. See Amnon Reichman, The Voice of America in
Hebrew-The US Influence on Israeli Freedom of Expression Doctrines, 3 L., Soc'Y & CULTURE
185 (2005) (Hebrew).
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likelihood" standard to state prosecutions of the offense dealt
with by the Suszkin case.
The Court ended up leaving this matter under considera-
tion, since it found that in any event, the "near certainty" test was
met: It was nearly certain that had the posters been posted or
handed to Palestinians in Hebron, harm to religious sentiments
would have been inflicted.135
The difficulty in the Court's act of "balancing" is clear.
First, from a liberal point of view, it is not clear that the value of
protection against emotional harm "weighs" less than the protec-
tion of a legitimate legal order (i.e., the core value at the basis of
sedition). As mentioned above, the Court chose to deem the
infliction of emotional harm as an ingredient of public peace,
and thus suggested that since the very existence of the legitimate
legal order weighs more than a mere disturbance to public
peace, sedition should require a lower probability standard than
infliction of harm on religious sentiments. Still, substantial viola-
tion of someone's emotional integrity, just like seriously violating
his bodily integrity, his dignity or his liberty, is not analogous to
disturbing public peace. Treating the claim to be free from
emotional harm-including religious grounds-as a mere pub-
lic interest of a lower standing is far from trivial.
The matter becomes even murkier when we take into con-
sideration that attempting to balance all the values raised in the
case would probably entail according "weight" to the fact that it
is not "ordinary" emotions that the offense protects, but relig-
ious sentiments.1"6 What is the core value that is protected by
135. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim of Suszkin's lawyer that only an
expert can determine the intensity of the suffering or the harm caused to the religious
feelings of Muslim believers. The Court declared that under the circumstances the
potential of the publication to cause severe harm is obvious and does not require any
further proof. See Suszkin, IsrSC 52(3) at 311. It should be noted that many criticize the
reliance on probabilities in matters of afflicting harm to public sentiments. Some
judges say that this is not a matter for probability analysis: either a certain statement
does offend sentiments, or it doesn't, and the court, like any member of society, is
equipped with the necessary basic social understandings to determine one from the
other. See HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film & Play Review BD [1989] IsrSC
43(2) 22, 42.
136. Daniel Statman suggests a historic explanation to the unique protection
granted to religious feelings. According to his theory, criminalizing the act of inflicting
harm on religious sentiments is a preserved remnant of a prohibition that originated in
the context of a religious society and lost its justification. He calls for granting a gen-
eral protection against emotional harm. See Statman, supra note 125.
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such an offense? Under Israeli law there is no offense that
criminalizes affliction of emotional harm as such (other than
torture, which includes emotional torture).137 Do religion and
religious feelings have an independent value? According to the
standard liberal model, referred to above, all rights deserve
equal respect and we should equally protect against harm to all
types of emotions. Singling out harm to religious sentiments is
problematic, and perhaps the Court should interpret the statu-
tory scheme to down-play the unique protection accorded to re-
ligious sentiments.
Some have suggested that religious sentiments are in fact
unique, because religion is a normative regime that competes
with the legal regime of the modern state. 38 Therefore, it is
prudent to accord religious sentiments a greater margin of toler-
ance, so as not to push believers into having to choose between
the authority of the state and the authority of their religion.
This tension between the competing claims of authority-legal
and religious-may be especially acute in Israel, a Jewish democ-
racy that does not separate state and religion, and where a con-
siderable minority of non-Jews (including atheists) live. In this
context, the state, including the judiciary, should demonstrate
extra-sensitivity to religious sentiments of all. Others make the
opposite point: Religious sentiments should not be accorded
special status, because co-existence requires a sphere where it is
accepted that all are free to express their sentiments, including
(religious) sentiments that offend the (religious) sentiments of
others. Stifling the expression of such offensive sentiments-for
example: the Jews are the chosen people and are therefore "su-
perior," the Jews have sinned for not accepting Jesus, Muham-
mad is the bearer of truth and the last prophet that ought not be
ridiculed-would only lead to alienation of some (if not all) re-
ligious groups. Attempting to chart a "correct" balance between
religious sentiments, sentiments in general, and free speech ap-
pears ever more elusive.
We should also recall the host of methodological difficulties
that arise when a balancing test is applied. How does the Court
137. The one exception is s.368C of the Penal Code, which criminalizes emotional
abuse among the offenses against minors and the helpless. Penal Law, 5737-1977, Hok
ha-'onashin 104 (Isr.).
138. See IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 33-46 (1975).
But see, in the American context, EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 129.
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ascertain the appropriate weight to assign to each right or inter-
est? After all, it is quite difficult to measure the harm done if the
speech is suppressed. Is it the harm to Ms. Suszkin? To those
who hold similar views? To the public at large? (The Israeli?
The Palestinian?) To the overall legitimacy of the system?
We see, then, that the balancing approach-at least the bal-
ancing that departs from strict vertical-leaves much to be de-
sired. Perhaps it might be worthwhile to revisit Justice Black's
admonition of the balancing test and the subsequent line of U.S.
jurisprudence, which could be understood as treating the act of
balancing as a last resort, to be used only when no non-balancing
doctrine or theory can prove helpful. The "clear and imminent
danger" test,'3 ' the strict scrutiny articulation applied to non-
neutral regulation in a public forum1 4 or the "actual malice"
requirement,' 4 ' are all examples of attempts to sidestep direct
balancing, at least in part, given the methodological difficulties
inherent in the act of "pure" value-balancing.
Horizontal balancing is problematic not only due to the in-
herent methodological difficulties alluded to above, but also to
the institutional dimension within which such balancing is to
take place. Setting a "balancing test" that requires judges to bal-
ance the competing values and principles means that multiple
judges, in multiple courts, would have to confront these issues.
Since the balancing test is methodologically taxing, it is reasona-
ble to expect different approaches to the cases that may arise in
various courts.' 4 2 This lack of uniformity and coherence within
the judicial branch itself may have detrimental consequences
not only to speech but to the legitimacy of judicial review as a
whole.' 43 This problem is of less importance in Israel, since the
Supreme Court sitting as a high court of justice retains original
jurisdiction over the matter, thus its doctrine does not have to
guide lower courts. It is therefore not surprising that the Israeli
Court approves of horizontal balancing, knowing that such bal-
ancing grants it with greater latitude to reach the desired bal-
139. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969).
140. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312 (1988).
141. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 289-98 (1964).
142. See Birnhack, supra note 121.
143. See Justice Stewart's strong opinion in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commis-
sion on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 400 (1973) (unfolding the dangers of "balanc-
ing" in the context of freedom of expression).
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ance in each case without having to supervise the exercise of
such discretion by other segments of the judiciary. However,
this institutional fact is in the process of changing, as the juris-
diction over public law matters is being transferred, slowly but
surely, to the district court level (the intermediate level in Israel,
above the courts of the peace)., 44 One can expect that unless
matters of constitutional law are restricted solely to the Supreme
Court sitting as a constitutional court-an idea that is being dis-
cussed but which raises a host of problems1 4 5-the application of
the balancing doctrine in lower courts in Israel is likely to raise
serious issues of uniformity.'
4 6
VI. COMPARATIVE LAW DIFFERENCES VS. SIMILARITIES
Thus far this Article has focused upon the differences be-
tween the U.S. and the Israeli legal systems. It has been as-
sumed, without discussion, that the statute at hand would have
been struck down by the courts had it been adopted in the
United States. The statute criminalizes protected speech, and
does so in a vague and overbroad manner. It singles out a cer-
tain class of speech-that which offends religious sensibilities-
over other classes of offensive speech, and is thus content-sensi-
tive and is discriminating on the basis of a viewpoint. 147  But
more fundamentally, it seeks to proscribe speech simply because
it is offensive to some, and thus clashes with the cornerstone of
144. See generally Meni Mazuz, Reform in Administrative Law: The Administrative Court
Law, 2000, 6(1) MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 233 (2001).
145. Law proposals to establish a constitutional court were raised often in the last
few years. See The Knesset, http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/Plaw-display.asp?law
tp=l (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). The impetus behind these ill-advised proposals is the
claim that the Israeli Supreme Court does not represent a wide enough range of sectors
in the society and therefore does not enjoy sufficient public confidence when dealing
with sensitive constitutional issues. See Yoav Dotan, Does Israel Need a Constitutional
Court?, 5 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 117 (2000); see also Symposium, On the Proposition to Estab-
lish a Constitutional Court, 6(2) MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 315 (2003).
146. Such issues might burden the appellate docket of the Supreme Court and
may require the Supreme Court to "discipline" lower courts of differing views. Given
the diverging opinions among Israeli jurists, including judges, regarding the proper
balance between values, the Supreme Court might in fact lose some of its institutional
capital as a result of such strife.
147. In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the conviction was reversed be-
cause the prohibiting statute was overbroad. In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992),
the majority reversed the conviction because the prohibition was "content based" and
the minority reversed because of the prohibition being over-broad.
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First Amendment principles.14 Even in matters of Hate Speech,
which raise issues of intimidation, silencing and discrimination,
the U.S. jurisprudence favors the protection of speech.14 Does
that mean that Tatyana Suszkin would have fared better had her
matter been brought before a U.S. court? Would U.S. courts al-
low a conviction for charges based on a general disturbance of
the peace or breach of public order offense?
U.S. courts have long since concluded that in some cases-
rare but identifiable-speech should be viewed as an act or as
conduct. 5 ' Since this conclusion is analytically curious-isn't all
speech conduct?-it is worthwhile to examine these "islands" of
unprotected speech in greater detail, and in particular, the doc-
148. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
149. For critical analysis see, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Ac-
tion for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982)
(favoring restrictions on hate speech); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of
Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 281, 285 (1995) (same); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech
and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 445 (1987) (same); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431 (1990) (same); Mat-
suda, supra note 104 (same); Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 1533-38 (discussing a four
stage model for justifying the tolerance of hate speech); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986)
(favoring tolerance for expressions of hate); Susan Gellman, Hate Speech And A New View
Of The First Amendment, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 309 (same); Marjorie Heins, Banning Words:
A Comment on "Words That Wound", 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983) (same).
150. The "clear and present danger" test, as described by Justice Holmes in Schenck
reflects the apprehension that words are action in the world in the sense that they have
real effect, and therefore should sometimes be treated as an act. See generally Schenck v.
U.S., 249 U.S 47 (1919). On the "speech-conduct" distinction, see JOHN R. SEARLE,
SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16-19 (1969); William B. Fisch,
American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVlth Interna-
tional Congress of Comparative Law: Section IV Hate Speech in the Constitutional Law of the
United States, 50 AM.J. CoMP. L. 463 (2002). See generally EdwardJ. Eberle, Cross Burning,
Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953 (2004). Eberle says that a
careful separation of speech from conduct may assist in regulating hate speech within
the boundaries of the First Amendment; for this it is required to distinguish between
the content (that can be hateful) and the conduct itself (threatening, intimidating,
etc.). Eberle sees a difference between cross burning in a Ku Klux Klan rally (protected
speech) and cross burning in the back yard of an African-American (conduct, and
therefore not protected to the same degree). This approach rests on our ability to
differentiate content from the conduct: Is not a rally also threatening conduct, at least
when the march traverses in predominantly black neighborhoods? See also, in a differ-
ent context, JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH 72 (1997). For a broader view of the
treatment of speech as conduct, especially with respect to speech promoting criminal
activity, see Eugene Volokh, Speech As Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277
(2005).
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trine known as "Fighting Words."' 5' In the famous Chaplinsky
case, 152 taking place during WWII, the Supreme Court stated,
ignoring the rather shaky factual basis of the case, that the Con-
stitution does not protect curses, namely speech that when ut-
tered does nothing but offend the person to which it is directed
or which will by its very nature cause an immediate violent reac-
tion. 51 It is usually the case that the Fighting Words doctrine
will apply when four conditions are met: (1) the speech is di-
rected against a specific person or a specific, present audience;
(2) both speaker and audience understand the content of the
utterance as a direct offense; 154 (3) under the circumstances in
which the speech was uttered the utterance was indeed, accord-
ing to accepted conventions of language, a direct provocation; 55
and (4) it is highly likely that the utterance would invoke the
151. For possible uses of the doctrine see KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS:
INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH (1995). For a discussion of the
development of the Fighting Words doctrine in the United States, and its influence, see
Claudia E. Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech: Damned If You Do And Damned If You Don't:
Lessons Learned From Comparing The German And U.S. Approaches, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 299,
318-21 (2005).
152. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
153. Id. Injustice Murphy's words in Chaplinsky:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72.
154. See Linda Friedlieb, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Desig-
nated Fighting Words, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 390-91 (2005). A famous example to the
contrary is the case of the Israeli student who referred to a group of African Americans
in the University of Pennsylvania as behemoths (in Hebrew), after these students raised
noise in the dorms and disturbed his studies. The student was convicted for violating
the code of conduct that governs expression on university premises and prohibits racist
or derogatory speech that refers to others on racial grounds. The student claimed that
this code violated his First Amendment rights, while the University claimed that the
speech amounted to Fighting Words, even if the black students did not fully understand
the meaning of the word behemoth in Hebrew. Technically speaking, this word refers
to water buffaloes, as a translator that was brought by the defense testified. However, its
everyday usage includes reference to rude, fat and crude people, as Israelis know. See
ALAN C. KoRs & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF
LIBERT' IN AMERICAN CAMPUSES 9-33 (1998). For analysis of freedom of expression on
campuses, see also Minow, supra note 104.
155. See Friedlieb, supra note 154, at 385-91.
[Vol. 31:76
THE PASSIONATE EXPRESSION OF HATE
violent reaction of the offended addressee.'56 The logic behind
the doctrine seems to be that the utterance of some words or
expressions may, in some circumstances, be outside the scope of
what we call "dialogue," "discourse," "debate" or any other delib-
erative activity.' 57 The content of these words, when uttered in a
certain context and a certain manner, may be equated to a
punch, which would, in all likelihood, prompt a response in ac-
tual violence.158 If this is indeed the logic, the anticipated reac-
tion-a fight-is only one element of the doctrine; its core lies
in the analysis of the nature of the utterance (discursive or not)
and the context of the utterance (again, discursive or not). The
paradigmatic Fighting Words would be uttered without an inter-
mediary medium; the words are thrown at the designated ad-
dressee face-to-face. Another characteristic of a paradigmatic in-
stance of Fighting Words is that the audience-individual or
group-is captive, in the sense that the addressee finds herself a
part of an interaction without ever asking to be part of the ex-
change, and the ability to ignore and disengage is often not real-
istic, under the circumstances.159
It is interesting to note that the language supporting this
doctrine is the language of balancing: The Court finds the value
of the expression to be substantially lower than the damage the
expression is likely to cause. The contribution of the utterance
156. But see GREENAWALT, supra note 151, at 35. "But suppose five white males
shout racial and sexual epithets at a lone black woman in the park . . . I believe deep
offense should sometimes warrant restrictions on speech, but probably only when there
are immediate, identifiable victims." It seems to me that the Suszkin case would still
qualify as a justified restriction.
157. As the Court emphasizes in Chaplinsky: "It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (cita-
tion omitted). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 795,
814-16 (1993); R. George Wright, Hermeneutics and Critique in Legal Practice: Traces of
Violence: Gadamer, Habermas and the Hate Speech Problem, 76 CHI. KENT L. Rv. 991,998-
1004 (2000).
158. This also means giving weight to the intentions of the speaker; Lasson sug-
gests that speech which is aimed to cause contempt to a racial group should be pre-
vented. Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel vs. Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23
DuQ. L. REv. 77, 123-27 (1984).
159. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1972). For a comparative discus-
sion of the evolution of the Fighting Words doctrine through "case by case jurispru-
dence that strikes a balance between individual rights and interests of the community,"
see Roza Pai, Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in International and
Comparative Legal Perspective, 23 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 223, 232 (2005).
2007]
118 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
to the discovery of truth is so infinitesimal that it cannot be con-
sidered "useful" to society.' 60 However, properly conceived, the
justification under-girding the Fighting Words doctrine does not
represent a balancing test: As a general matter, judges are not
asked to determine whether a certain utterance is "useful" or its
value exceeds the damage it causes. Judges must determine
whether, under the circumstances, the speech contained a claim
that could conceivably be a part of a dialogue, or whether it was
merely an act of aggression, committed through words. 6 ' Con-
ceptually, cursing another human being is not a mode of com-
munication of ideas, thoughts, facts or opinions that is protected
under the normative apparatus discussed above any more than
shoving that person aside.162 It is true that a fight word conveys
"information"-otherwise it will not have the power to provoke a
violent reaction-but conveying information in and of itself is
not necessarily a discursive enterprise: a commander orders his
soldiers to attack; the mind orders the muscles to contract; the
stop sign informs the drivers to stop. While all are acts that con-
vey information, they are not discursive, in the sense that they
are not an element of a conversation. Therefore, rather than
"balancing" competing interests, or having judges evaluate
whether a certain utterance is "useful" (as if it was a commodity
or a service), applying the Fighting Words doctrine requires
judges to classify types of human interaction into "discursive"
and "non-discursive".
The Fighting Words category of interaction falls outside the
scope of the First Amendment not only because of the nature of
the message (in context) but because of the nature of the Con-
stitution. As mentioned, the theory underlying the First Amend-
ment focuses on the protection of speech from governmental
regulation of a certain communicative medium or of a certain
communicative content.'63 The Constitution is not there in or-
160. See Gooding v. Wilson, 495 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).
161. In Gooding v. Wilson, 495 U.S. at 528, the Court emphasizes the requirement
for proof that an immediate bteach of peace is likely to come about in response to the
expressive conduct.
162. The threats exception to the First Amendment has also generated a number
of cases that illustrate this distinguishing principle. See generally Kenneth L. Karst,
Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REv.
1337 (2006).
163. See HABERMAS, supra note 32, at 8-17; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 32, at 1-27. See
generally Post, supra note 40.
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der to protect a person from a valid claim of another individual
for breaching a duty owed under private law towards that indi-
vidual. So, as a general matter, if one person breaches a private
law duty towards another individual-for example, commits a
tort of aggression-the Constitution will not be implicated. Pri-
vate law will, as mentioned earlier, deal with the case under the
standard common-law model.164
However, criminal offenses, including a prohibition against
breach of the peace or public order, do raise constitutional ques-
tions, since the government resorts to the use of coercive state
power. 16 5 Yet since these offenses on their face are not designed
or aimed at any medium for the communication of ideas nor are
they content-sensitive, the First Amendment need not invalidate
the law.1 66 The criminal statute itself would pass constitutional
muster. The application of the law, however, in a concrete case
involving speech, must nevertheless pass judicial scrutiny in or-
der to ensure that the criminal code does not trespass into the
protected medium of deliberation or regulate the content of
such deliberation. Thus, we could expect that if (and only if)
the expression in question is not part of any discourse or dia-
logue but is rather, under the circumstances, an utterance of in-
timidating hate-a curse-a criminal prosecution for breach of
the peace would be held constitutional.
In light of the above, we see that while it is unclear whether
the First Amendment jurisprudence would have allowed the sur-
vival of the underlying statute,16 7 at least on the doctrinal level a
conviction could have been reached (and allowed to stand) in
the United States, despite the wide gap discussed in the earlier
164. See generally Amnon Reichman, A Charter-Free Domain: In Defense of Dolphin De-
livery, 35 U.B.C. L. REV. 329 (2002).
165. When the claim is that a statute or a regulation violates a constitutional right,
it is an obvious case of state action, i.e., the involvement of the government is sufficient
to apply a constitutional provision. For an illuminating discussion of the use of the
private/public divide in the First Amendment context, see Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches To The first Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375
(1990).
166. This is not to say that we should ignore the effect of the statute, even if this
effect is merely "secondary". See Steven H. Shifrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence,
and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 53 (1994).
167. Cf Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). While Beauharnais was not
directly overturned, it is difficult to reconcile its holding with feature cases and with the
underlying principles of the marketplace of ideas, evidenced, for example, in N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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chapters of this Article. If calling a police officer a Fascist
amounts to a Fighting Word, 6 ' it is not far-fetched to suggest
that the doctrine applies to Suszkin's distribution of her posters,
especially given the social context of hostility between the Arabs
of Hebron (living under the regime of belligerent occupation)
and Jewish settlers, and the fact that by affixing the posters to
the homes of Palestinians in this area, an unmediated confronta-
tion with the inhabitants (as a captive audience) was highly likely
to ensue. 69 Interestingly-and this Article will speculate on a
possible reason for this"'-the Israeli Court did not take the
time to consult comparative law in this case, notwithstanding the
clear comparative tendencies of the Court in freedom of expres-
sion cases.' 7 ' As a result, the Fighting Words doctrine is not yet
an official part of Israeli law on point. However, it seems that
the underlying rational behind the analysis of the Court is com-
patible with the premise of the doctrine.
In order to avoid an unnecessary chilling effect, and in or-
der to ensure that the state action (the prosecution of the of-
fense) is narrowly tailored to protect only against an act of ag-
gression committed by one individual against another (either as
an individual or as a member of a group) without inhibiting pro-
tected speech, it is recommended that this doctrine should be
adopted in Israel. 172 The prosecution would need to demon-
strate actual intent to harm, not only an awareness of the nature
of the act (or, in this case, the speech). By raising the bar, we
would allow the courts to match the specific intent of the
speaker with the objective understanding of the meaning of his
168. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
169. The legal status of Arabs in Israel makes the Israeli Court's position particu-
larly difficult. One observer has noted that "within Israel, inherently discriminatory
provisions disadvantage not only Palestinian Arabs but to a significant extent citizen
Israeli Arabs in access to land, and effectively, to the full panoply of citizens' rights."
Andrew Grossman, "Islamic Land": Group Rights, National Identity and Law, 3 UCLA J.
lst.Amiw & NEAR E.L. 53, 88 (2003).
170. See infra. Part VII.
171. HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am Co. Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871 is
the most significant example of this. See also HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Jerusalem Dist.
Comm'r [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; HCJ 606/93 Kidum Entr. & Pub. (1981) Ltd v. Broad-
casting Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 1.
172. Israel will thus join other common law democracies. For a discussion of how
the Australian High Court has recognized "a Fighting Words-type exception," see Wil-
liam Buss, Constitutional Words About Words: Protected Speech and "Fighting Words" Under the
Australian and American Constitutions, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNrEMP. PROBs. 489, 497
(2006).
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or her speech. ' 73  This standard, if applied to the case of the
Danish cartoons mentioned at the opening of this Article, will
likely prohibit prosecution of the cartoonist or the paper, if in-
deed no intent to harm was present.1 7 4
In Suszkin, the judges in the lower courts, having established
the facts and upon these facts having reached a conviction,
stated that it was proven that Suszkin intended nothing but to
"retaliate" against the Arabs, insult for insult.1 7 5 She had no in-
tention of engaging anyone in dialogue or debate. She was not
trying to make a point through satire, or provoke thought and
reflection; only to hurt the other side, akin to throwing a stone
at these members of the Muslim community whose houses would
serve as billboards. This subjective intent matches the objective
meaning of her action. Under the circumstances, 76 posting this
173. Of course, the objective understanding of the speech can serve as an eviden-
tiary tool to prove the speaker's intent: If a speaker expected-or would be hard
pressed not to expect-that his speech would in all certainty cause injury to feelings,
one may presume that he meant to cause this injury. In the case of CrimA 2831/95
Rabbi Iddo Elba v. Israel [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 221, the Justices debated whether for the
offense of inciting racism (Penal Law, s.144, 5737-1977, Hok ha-'onashin 56 (Isr.)) this
presumption could serve as a substitute for the actual intent required by the offense. A
final decision was not made since on the facts of the case, actual intent could be proved.
See Benvenisti, supra note 108; Mordechai Kremnitzer, Elba Case: "Clarification of the
Laws of Inciting Racism", 30(1) MISHPATIM 105 (1999). Compare also to Statman, supra
note 125, at 141-49. 1 am leaning towards requiring actual intent that is not satisfied by
the common-sense presumption of the natural effects of one's actions, but in the Israeli
case it is too soon to conclude whether insisting on specific intent would produce the
desired regime.
174. It could be argued that in the Danish case there was foreseeability of harm,
and perhaps even an intent to cause harm, in the quest of demonstrating that such
harm should be tolerated in a modern liberal democracy. I am not sure that this is in
fact the case on either count; I actually doubt that there was intent, or that one could
have expected the harm (and/or its degree). But in any event, it seems to me that the
medium of communication does make a difference: Cartoons in newspapers are differ-
ent than posters placated on houses of a captive audience. Moreover, the content of
the cartoons was thought provoking-as is the case in much of satire-whereas we
would be really hard pressed to find the thought provoking element contained in
Suszkin's poster (beyond the pure insult).
175. See CrimC (Jer) 436/97 Israel v. Suszkin, [1997] IsrDC 97(5) 730. Suszkin
herself told a psychiatrist that her purpose in drawing the posters was to "show the
Muslims the true face of their religion and by that hurt their religious feelings like they
hurt Jewish feelings."
176. 100,000 Palestinians and 500jews live in Hebron, which is probably the most
sensitive point of friction between Jewish and Palestinian civilians in the occupied terri-
tories. The peak of the tension was the massacre of Muslim worshipers in the Tomb of
the Patriarchs (burial site of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sara, Rebecca and Leah according
to tradition) in February 1994 by ajewish settler. The situation in Hebron is described
122 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
poster in Hebron by gluing it to doors and walls constitutes an
act of aggression, committed through words; her words are thus
"Fighting Words." Had the Court resorted to the doctrine of
Fighting Words, it could have sidestepped the quagmire of hate
speech altogether, thus keeping true to first principles under
which irritating speech is still protected. Furthermore, the
judges would not have had to go down the slippery slope of
probabilities-whether it was likely, probable, highly probable or
nearly certain that feelings would be hurt.1 77 In addition, they
would not have needed to determine the "degree of pain" or the
extent of emotional harm suffered (or likely to be suffered) by
the audience.
After all, Suszkin was convicted of a criminal offense, and
the act of establishing such probabilities or assessments would
introduce an element of uncertainty to the application of of-
fenses that regulate speech. Such uncertainty may lead to a chil-
ling effect and to selective enforcement. The facts of the Suszkin
case were such that the lower courts could establish that a rea-
sonable Muslim exposed to this poster directly-if since it was
handed to her or placated on her walls-would be not only out-
raged and offended but see the poster as cursing her as a pig-
follower. 171 It is difficult to see any other message conveyed by
the poster, especially given the context of its distribution and the
fact that the pig is considered vile by Islam (and Judaism). 79
Since it is difficult to see how distribution of such posters in He-
bron, given the social context of occupation, would not lead to
riots, the state can properly treat Suszkin's actions as an attempt
in THE REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE FOR THE MASSACRE IN CAVE
OF MACHPELA (1994).
177. It should be recalled, though, that in the usual case where a claim of hurt
feelings is raised, the question to be asked is not whether the speech is likely-and in
what likelihood-to hurt feelings (religious or other): In most cases the injury to feel-
ings is the underlying premise. The right question to be asked as far as probabilities
and balancing are concerned is whether-and in what likelihood-public order or
peace is likely to be disturbed as a result of the speech in question. But if public order
is not the question, only hurt feelings, then no question of probabilities should be
raised. See HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film & Play Review BD [1989]
IsrSC 43(2) 22, 41. The important question is therefore what are we protecting: The
injured feelings of the individual, or the public order.
178. Suszkin, IsrDC 97(5) at 730.
179. The Court in Suszkin relied on judicial notice for the fact that under Islam the
pig is defiled. CrimA 697/98 Suszkin v. Israel [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 289, 300. If a
"damned fascist" is a curse, as Chaplinski tells us, so is a "pig follower".
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to violate order and peace of the kind that should not be pro-
tected by the constitutional order.
The unique facts of Suszkin differentiate the case from other
cases where arguably equally offensive speech was posted on in-
ternet sites, in newspaper caricatures, as part of art shows, dance
shows and exhibitions, or as part of a motion picture. The Is-
raeli Court realized that although the speech is offensive, the
social context is such that warrants the protection of the offen-
sive speech. In all of the latter cases the Israeli Court has system-
atically ruled in favor of freedom of expression, despite the fact
that feelings were hurt, sensibilities offended and emotions in-
jured. 8 ° In these cases, the Israeli Court was sensitive to the cen-
trality of expression in a democratic regime, even when such
speech may have infringed upon other rights. Between vying to
maintain solidarity-by minimizing the infliction of harms to
any groups' feelings-and managing conflicts through allowing
expression (including harsh or insensitive expressions), the
Court chose the latter (as long as no specific legislation on point
ordered differently).181 It seemed the Court, in applying admin-
istrative review through statutory interpretation, came to the
conclusion that in Israel's deeply divided society, insisting on de-
corum in mainstream media for the sake of solidarity might
eventually lead to less cohesion, since the stifled speech might
180. In HCJ 14/86 Laorv. Film &PlayReviewBD [1987] lsrSC 41(1) 421, the Court
ruled in favor of displaying a play that was claimed to offend the feelings of the Jewish
public, because it compared the Israeli army to the Nazis. In CA 316/03 Bachri v. Mov-
ies' Review Council [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249, the Court struck down the decision of the
Council to refuse a license to the movie '"enin Jenin" by Bachri. Under Israeli law, a
license must be obtained for public showings. The film, which described the events in
the refugee camp in April 2002, was allowed to be screened despite the fact that accord-
ing to the Court it depicted events "in a distorted way that hurt the feelings of soldiers
and families of slain soldiers." In HCJ 606/93 Kidum Entr. & Pub. (1981), Ltd. v. Broad-
casting Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 1, the Court allowed the broadcasting of an adver-
tisement that had a sexual double-entendre, despite its offensive character. In HCJ
1514/01 Gur-Aryeh v. TV. & Radio Second Authority [2001] lsrSC 55(4) 267, the Court
ruled in favor of broadcasting a T.V. show on Saturday despite the injury to the relig-
ious feelings of participants in the show. All of these decisions were based on the asser-
tion that the injuries caused by the speech fall within the margin that a democratic
society should be able to tolerate.
181. For example, Non-Profit Organizations Law, 1980, S.H. 210, gives the regiS-
trar the authority to refuse registering an association that uses a deceiving or offensive
name. In several cases the courts favored the decision of the registrar rather than the
freedom of expression of the association. See CA 9/86 Ass'n of Religious Court Prison-
ers' v. Non-profit Org. Register [1986]; OM (Jer) 362/00 Attorney Gen. v. Hilel Ass'n
[2001].
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find other outlets, less favorable to Israeli society's sense of soli-
darity. 18 2 It may, of course, be the case that the Court did not
need to confront a stream of highly insidious satire delivered
through conventional media, because self-censorship was exer-
cised effectively. Thus far very few cartoons that were purely
spiteful have made it to publication (at least in the mainstream
papers). 8 ' As an observer, it seems to me that most cartoons
involve true satire, and thus it would have been difficult to chal-
lenge their print in court.1 84  In any event, the Suszkin case
reveals the outer limits of the judicial (and statutory) tolerance
to offensive speech. As applied, the case is sensitive not only to
the content of the satirical communication-depicting Muham-
mad as a pig, and thus meeting the criteria of "pure offense"-
but also to the non-mediated, captive dimension of the offensive
interaction.
It would seem, then, that the different social context-the
different medium of communication-makes a difference.
Time, place and manner play a role not only in the usual cases of
demonstrations and parades,'85 but also in determining whether
the speech rises to the level of Fighting Words or not. Unlike
182. See the opinion of Justice Barak in EA 11280/02 Central Elections Committee for
Sixteenth Knesset v. MK Tibby [2003] lsrSC 57(4) 1, 21. Barak emphasized the point that
it is better for democracy that un-democratic pressures would be relived in the demo-
cratic channels, rather than other non-democratic channels (that might be violent).
According to Barak, such an attitude is not only pragmatically sound, but also reflects
democracy's resilience. Compare, in a different context, to justice Brennan's opinion
in Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989):
[W]e are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place in
our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today.
Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness
that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism
such as Johnson's is a sign and source of our strength.
But see Fredrick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. Rv. 1321 (1992).
Schauer claims that we should be aware that only particular groups (and usually weak
ones) are carrying the burden of free speech: "All too often, those who defend the
existing approach by saying 'this is the price we pay for a free society' are not the ones
that pay very much of the price." Id. at 1355.
183. It could very well be that in retrospect, cartoons from the fifties, sixties and
seventies would seem to us imbued with stereotypes; but it is still generally true that the
Israeli media, both Jewish and Arab, didn't truly test the limits of tolerance, whereas
these limits were further pushed in books, pamphlets and shows.
184. See, e.g., NOAH BEE, IN SPITE OF EVERYTHING!: HISTORY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
IN POLITICAL CARTOONS (1973); E. KJSHON & Dosii, So SORRY WE "'ON (1967); RA'ANAN
LURIE, BEST CARTOONS FROM ISRAEL (1962).
185. The "time, place and manner" doctrine established in Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941), was adopted in Israel in HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Southern District
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the allocative use of time, place and manner in the famous doc-
trine, in the context of Fighting Words, no balancing is neces-
sary. Time, place and manner are indicia to the nature of the
"speech act"-communication of an idea or the hurl of a verbal
punch.
VII. BEYOND DOCTRINE: COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES
Distinctive normative conceptions, institutional designs and
organizing doctrines provide only a partial explanation for the
different approaches to the protection of free speech adopted in
the United States and Israel. A fuller explanation requires ex-
ploration of two additional factors. First, each society may have a
different collective conception of what it means to "speak." Sec-
ond, religion plays significantly different roles in the two coun-
tries. While the United States seeks to define itself as a sovereign
separated from religion, Israel explicitly recognizes the role re-
ligion plays in official public life.' 86
Although scant reliable empirical data on point exists, it is
nonetheless submitted that in Israel, the meaning of words-
spoken and written-is different from their meaning in the
United States, not because the content is different, but because
the power of the word is different. According to this hypothesis,
in the United States, the word is the opinion of the speaker to
which he or she is entitled. In Israel, words have an indepen-
dent force; nearly mystical. Somewhat paradoxically, words are
taken more seriously in Israel than in the United States, and
therefore receive lower legal protection. In Israel, words are
more dangerous-not necessarily because of the reaction they
may elicit from others but because of their very nature-and
therefore the speaker should beware (and the State might en-
sure that others are protected from such speech). Words are
seen as having the power to constitute reality."8 7 In the United
Commissioner [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 393, 412; see also HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v.Jerusalem Dist.
Comm'r [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456, 481.
186. See generally Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional
Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STAa. J. INT'L L. 47 (2004).
187. The biblical saying, "Death and life are at the behest of the tongue" (Proverbs
18:21), is used frequently. The importance of words in the Israeli public sphere is re-
flected in the high interest and public reaction to the mystical-religious "pulsa de-ntra"
rituals held by national religious extremists in order to bring a curse upon Prime Minis-
ters Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon.
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States, one person's word does not necessarily have substantial
weight when it clashes with another person's word. Not so in
Israel. Each speaker is taken as having a formative power, and
once a word is spoken it cannot be taken back. As if the speak-
ing of the word has a role both in reflecting and constructing
the world around us, where images and symbols, rationality and
emotions, passion and reason, truths and beliefs, past and fu-
ture, human autonomy and divine intervention are all inter-
laced.
From the perspective of an informed observer, it seems that
words spoken by a person regarding another person in the Is-
raeli society tie both the speaker and the subject of the speech to
the collective, in a different manner than in the United States.
In the United States-to the extent that we may talk about the
United States in singular terms-people define themselves
through their own speech, and take pride in having a "thick
skin" that allows them to tolerate disagreeable and even offen-
sive expressions of others.188 Speech thus connects individuals
to other individuals by stressing their individualism. In Israel, on
the other hand, the status of a person and his belonging in the
collective is determined in no small degree by what people say
about him or her. In Israel, "thick skin" means detachment,
alienation and perhaps uncaring, a position seen as reflecting
negatively on the moral fiber of the person. In Israel, speech
connects members of the community to a greater relational
whole.
While in the United States-a rather heterogeneous soci-
ety-speech forms the common ground which citizens share-
they are all speakers-speech in Israel, a hyper-heterogeneous
society, is often perceived as a threat to basic solidarity, a tool
capable of further dividing society into tribal units.18 At least as
far as political speech is concerned, the U.S. system acts as if
there exists an "all American" sphere, slightly removed from the
188. Compare to Adam Liptak, A Bit of Thin Skin Peeks Out of the Robes, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2007, at A17, decrying the sensitivity of judges against critique launched against
their craft by other judges or lawyers. The point of the article is clear: Thick skin is a
virtue, at least for anyone holding an official position.
189. Tribalism poses significant threats to the solidarity of the Israeli collective.
The problem is particularly acute for Palestinians whose group identity "hinges on the
experience of dispossession and exile throughout the twentieth century." Dan Rabino-
witz, The Common Memory of Loss: Political Mobilization Among Palestinian Citizens of Israel,
50J. A NrrHROPOLOGICAL REs. 27, 28 (1994).
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organic characteristics of the different communities, where
speech is not only the emblem of individual liberty, but its pro-
tection serves to unite the different individuals (and the differ-
ent communities) into members in that all-American collec-
tive.' 9 ° In Israel, given its highly diverse composition (all packed
into a small piece of land), this all-national sphere is infused with
identity symbols that do not necessarily sanctify each individual
as a speaker in the democratic discourse, but rather value the
collective and the struggles it is facing: "We are all Israelis since
we all face the same challenges and missions; inflicting harm on
the mosaic of beliefs that form the Israeli fabric would thus en-
danger maintaining the ensemble." Moreover, this all-Israeli
sphere-to the extent that it exists-would not necessarily be
governed by reason; it could well be in the domain of passion,
where the common currency is one of deep commitment to ide-
ologies and desire to promote beliefs. If this is the case, the
Court would be hard pressed to fully adopt the U.S. approach
towards community-building through free speech. While it
might be the case that the Court would urge all members of the
society to view the commitment to free speech as the bedrock
principle upon which to establish membership, the different
meaning of speech itself might limit the success of such efforts.
This difference is reinforced once other sociological dimen-
sions are recognized, primarily the centrality of religion and the
lack of separation between state and religion in Israel. 9 ' While
in the United States, the Constitution can be seen as forming the
role of a civil religion,192 such a role in Israel would amount to a
direct clash between state and religion. 93 As mentioned earlier,
it is no wonder that the British legislature (during the Mandate
period accorded to Britain following WWI) saw fit to prohibit
190. As Paul Stern has noted, in the realm of American public discourse, "unre-
strained debate" allows Americans to "deliberatively define both their collective and
individual purposes." Paul G. Stern, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its
Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE LJ. 925, 929 (1990) (emphasis in original).
191. One of the effects of Israel being a Jewish State is that to some extent the
public sees it as legitimate if some basic liberties are limited in order to maintain the
Jewish character of the State. These limitations concern marriage and divorce statutes,
Shabbat and holidays etc. See AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw OF ISRAEL 339 (6th Ed. 2005).
192. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH, CIVIL RELIGION IN AMERICA (1967); see also
MARCELA CRISTI, FROM CIVIL TO POLITICAL RELIGION 47-89 (2001).
193. See Gideon Sapir, The Boundaries of Establishment of Religion, 8(1) MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL 155 (2005).
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speech derisive to other religions; 194 such speech would likely
result in actual violence, but of equal importance, such speech
would bring the foundation upon which the modern state (and
the rule of law) rests into direct conflict with the foundation
upon which religion (and religious law) rest, to the detriment of
both.
While in the United States public discourse is taken to be
the sacred domain of thought and critique, this may not be so
everywhere. In societies where religion is not separated from
state and not based on the notion of a civil society unified by
faith in the civil constitution-but rather on the notion of a deity
and a god-given religious order-public discourse is not sacred
for the sake of discourse (thought, deliberation, etc.) but may be
either sacred or sacrilegious, depending on whether the dis-
course clashes with direct religious commands, thereby prompt-
ing a religious duty to reset the boundaries of public discourse.
In such heterogeneous societies, civility is essential. While the
civil religion of the United States encourages people to fight to
protect the rights of all citizens to express their views, the various
religious groups that comprise the religious fabric in Israel be-
lieve there is a duty to fight to purge from public discourse
speech which utterance violates a specific religious duty placed
on the listeners as participants in a conversation (beyond the
general duty to avoid profane speech). For example, if the holy
name of the Jewish God will be printed by Jews on leaflets and
distributed to other Jews in a manner that clearly violates the
commandment not to carry God's name in vain, Orthodox Jews
will be compelled, as a matter of religious duty, to act in order to
curtail such publication. The recent clashes with the Muslim
world over the cartoons of Muhammad demonstrate a similar
approach. Viewed from the liberal civil religion, these duties
present a claim of freedom of religion.' 95
Moreover, in religion, speech connects a person to God pos-
itively (prayer) or negatively (blasphemy). And since God acts
towards all members of the faith, both prayer and blasphemy are
communal acts, and thus the community has a direct stake in the
194. Criminal Code Ordinance 285.559-60 (1936) forbids sedition. Seditious in-
tention includes "[promoting] ill-will and hostility between different sections of the
population of Palestine." The ordinance was the law of the British mandate, and re-
mained in force until 1977.
195. Cf Feldman, supra note 129.
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content of the speech. Since speech exists in this metaphysical
domain, it may bring good (blessing) or harm (curse) to others,
and thus the community is yet again directly involved in the act
of speech, since it is the duty of the community to care for its
members.' 96
If these hypotheses indeed capture a glimpse of the social
reality, they provide further insights into some of the differences
between Israel and the United States. On the ground, as any-
body who has spent time in Israel can attest, speech on all sub-
ject matters is vigorous, if not rambunctious; but institutionally,
the courts in Israel and the United States operate under differ-
ent social conditions.
The Israeli court, as an organ of the State, has to chart its
course not only between opposing attitudes towards the state as
"ours" or "theirs" (discussed above) but also with respect to its
own role, given the tension between the civil religion (liber-
alism) and the deity-based religion (Judaism, Islam). On the
one hand, the court is expected to appear as a neutral body,
devoid of any value-laden tilt toward one conception of the state
or another, let alone one ideology over another. Public confi-
dence rests on the assumption that judges separate themselves
from the passionate battle of ideals, energetically fought in the
Israeli public sphere.' 97 On the other hand, the notion that the
court is fully separated from the other organs of state govern-
ance or from a certain ideology-a virtue, under the U.S. model
of separation of powers-is seen not only as unrealistic by some,
but as undesirable in Israel.' In the final analysis, all organs of
the state are burdened with the collective mission of creating
and sustaining a Jewish democracy; the courts should get no
196. Kenneth Lasson, supra note 77, presents the different meaning of "speech" in
a secular and religious context. Lasson claims that religious speech, being more power-
ful, requires other standards from those used when regulating secular Fighting Words.
197. Barak views the obligation of the Court to maintain the public confidence as
one of the foundations of the judicial power. See Aharon Barak, Supreme Court and Public
Confidence, in SELECTED WRITING 965, 970 (Haim H. Cohen ed., 2000). Haim Cohen
represents the contrary view, claiming that the conception of public confidence is un-
necessary and possibly damaging. See Haim H. Cohen, Denial Thought About "Public Con-
fidence", 14 MISHPAT 9 (2002).
198. According to Dafna Barak-Erez the identification of the Israeli Supreme
Court with the national ideology is the source of the public confidence in it. See DAFNA
BARAK-EREZ, MILESTONE JUDGMENTS OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT 128 (2003); see also
Alexandre Kedar et al., Interview with Justice Dalia Dorner, 1 DIN UDVARIM, HAIFA L. REV.
15, 51 (2004).
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leave of absence. The idea that the court is disengaged and de-
tached would strike at least some as heresy: Is a court in a Jewish
democracy just like a court in any other liberal democracy? Is
Israel not unique? If it is not, why do we fight for its existence?
It is therefore no wonder that the Court, while striving to ensure
the robust sphere of the exchange of ideas, ideologies and be-
liefs as the tenets of liberal democracy everywhere demand, is
nonetheless careful to note that it is a genuinely Israeli constitu-
tional law that the Court is developing.1 99 Comparative law,
while informative and inspirational, is nonetheless a limited
source of law according to the Israeli Court, not only because it
lacks formal authority, but because its origins are rooted in sys-
tems with different social conditions and legal conceptions."' 0
VIII. SOME HERETICAL REFLECTIONS ON SPEECH THEORY
AND THE ROLE OF PASSION
The general baseline in relation to which current (and most
of the historic) debate concerning freedom of speech rests is the
baseline of public reason. When Habermas writes on the impor-
tance of speech and discourse in modern democracy, he as-
sumes at least a minimal level of knowledge of the facts, compe-
tence to analyze them and the use of a reason-based methodol-
ogy with which to achieve a decision and convince others.20 1
The same applies for similar theories of Rawls and
Meiklejohn. 212 The primary justifications for the supremacy of
freedom of speech over other rights and freedoms-as men-
tioned earlier-are reason-based. 2" These justifications are
based on the correlation between community and communica-
199. See Chief Justice Barak in HCJ 1715/97 Lishkat Menahaley Hashka'ot v. Minister
of Finance [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367, 403:
Indeed, comparative law reassures the judge that the interpretation given to
the legal text is accepted and works well in otherjurisdictions. However, com-
parative inspiration ought not lead to imitation and disparagement. The ulti-
mate decision must always be "local." Moreover, we should also be aware of
the limitations of comparative law. The law reflects the society, and our soci-
ety is different from other societies.
200. Id.
201. See JORGEN HABERMAS, Knowledge and Human Interests (Jeremy Shapiro
trans., 1971) (1968).
202. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1965); JOHN RAWLS, JUS-
TICE AS FAIRNESS 90 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
203. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, in TEACHER
OF FREEDOM 248-50 (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed., 1981).
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tion, democracy and deliberation.2" 4 Thus, the speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment is, at its core, speech that conveys
a discursive message, speech that begins (o; is a part of) a con-
versation which is based on-and which fosters-reasoned argu-
ments. Fighting Words reside outside the scope of the First
Amendment protection precisely because they cannot be justi-
fied as part of the reason-based sphere of public discourse.2 °5
Similarly, according to Post, libel against public figures should
be suspended (or restricted to cases of actual malice) because
the public sphere should be detached from the norms of the
organic communities that comprise the United States, so as to
allow (dispassionate) critique by members of all communities.2 °6
It is through such processes of critique that the members of the
different communities can identify with the "all American" en-
tity, the governance of which is often beyond their practical con-
trol. This baseline is challenged once the assumption is no
longer that people assess the facts, debate rationally over mat-
ters, or engage in reason-based self-reflection over values. If a
competing baseline is identified, where reason and reason-based
critique resides alongside passion and passion-based argument,
then the traditional justifications of constitutional protection for
freedom of speech need re-examination.
Modern research in various fields acknowledges that reason
and rationality might in fact not be the sole, or dominant, fea-
ture of public (and private) decision-making or reflection.20 7
Additionally, some claim that moral judgment cannot be fully
separated from moral sentiment, such as passion (or outrage) .208
204. See LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAw HIERARCHY, AND OFFEN-
SIVE PUBLIC SPEECH 28 (2004), for a critique of how traditional legal justifications for
free speech "do not consider the relative positions of power among those involved in
speech interactions."
205. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). For a more
nuanced analysis see GREENAWALT, supra note 151.
206. See Post, supra note 44, at 642.
207. See, e.g., SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REA-
SONING 252 (1998); A NrONio R. DAMASiO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND
THE HUMAN BRAIN (1995); DANIEL KAHANEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC, & AMOS TvFRsK, JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
208. For such a statement in a different context see WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE
DEATH OF OUTRAGE (1999) (claiming that U.S. President Bill Clinton's affair with
Monica Lewinski must enrage us precisely because it offends our values). Without sub-
scribing to the actual arguments made, their structural logic is important: It calls for a
moral sense of indignation.
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It could very well be the case that we are convinced, at the end of
the day, by what we feel. Moreover, as Weiler argued, nation-
states are constructed, at least in part, around what he identifies
as "eros": a sense of passionate solidarity.2 9 If indeed reason-
based deliberation is not the sole mode governing interpersonal
ethical engagement with public (and private) matters, and if in-
deed it is also through the expression of passion that we form
our values, we must further inquire into the scope of the consti-
tutional protection of speech.210 If speech is an expression of
passion, should we grant it less protection, because it does not
further the quest for truth or the Habermasian notion of legiti-
macy-generating discourse?211  Or perhaps the other way
around: If at the end of the day moral judgment is a matter of
sentiment, should we not be more tolerant of passion-based ex-
pression, and allow passion a longer leash? Suszkin's expression
was certainly passionate; should we strive to rein such expression
in, as I suggested earlier, through the doctrine of Fighting
Words? Or should we develop a sphere where passion is recog-
nized as an important element in moral judgment, and thus view
Suskin's expression as deserving protection since it provoked us
into the type of moral engagement which cannot be divorced
from passion? This, of course, is not to say that the moral out-
rage the poster incident raises should prevent or forestall an un-
equivocal moral denunciation of Suskin's act. Such denuncia-
tion is indeed called for. But on first impression, accepting pas-
sion as an organizing matrix of public discourse-alongside
reason-should accord it greater breathing room.21 2 On the
other hand, if passion is taken seriously, can we maintain the
faith-the passionate faith-in a constitutional order that bars
any criminal prosecution of Suskin's provocation? Solidarity
209. WEILER, supra note 103, at 324-355.
210. See Martha Nussbaum, The Discernment of Perception, in LovE's KNOWLEDGE: Es-
SAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 81-82 (1990) (arguing that "theorizing needs to be
completed with intuitive and emotional responses"); see also ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A
PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGIN OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 44 (1990).
211. Jfirgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Law and Social Theory, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 38 (1988).
212. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (hold-
ing that in the absence of showing that serious violent activity followed the speeches,
organizer who made impassioned speeches which contained references to violence
against those who did not participate could not be held liable), with NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), and NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
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(fraternity, or sisterhood) could be understood as an element of
passion: We feel strongly towards "our people" and therefore
are willing to act in order to defend threats against our people
or its members (whereas we might not act in order to defend
others). It could very well be the case that in a society where
passion is central, the Court would have been perceived as acting
illegitimately had it not convicted Suszkin. After all, the Court
itself must perform its role in passionately rejecting a passionate
challenge to the very fabric of co-existence between Muslims and
Jews in Israel (especially given the fact that the offense occurred
in Hebron). Perhaps the Suszkin case provides a rare example of
a passionate articulation of values by the Court itself, intended to
sustain the passionate belief in the constitutional order in
Israel. t3
As can be seen, re-organizing the sphere of public discourse
to accommodate for passion along with reason-based critique
might lead to a significantly different understanding of the regu-
lation of speech. Much is still to be explored in this field, and
the above only marks the starting point.
IX. EN LIEU OF CONCLUSION - COMPARATIVE
SCHOLARSHIP, PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND THE
LIMITS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Inflicting harm on religious sensibilities is an offense most
courts would be wary of implementing. It places the court in the
predicament of defining what religious sentiments are, what
hurts them, why these feelings deserve protection greater than
protections other sentiments receive, and above all, it places the
court in the position of taking sides in what may often be a
heated debate about speech versus religion, a position from
which most courts would stay away at nearly all costs.214 Suszkin
213. Compare Justice Brennan's passionate plea in the context of the clash of sym-
bols apparent in the flag-burning cases in the United States. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989).
214. The conflicting claims of Muslims and Jews to pray on the Temple Mount, as
well as the issue of archeological digging there, forced the Court to deal with the weight
of religious feelings in what seems to be the most symbolic and sensitive place to all
three religions. The Supreme Court adopted in those cases the doctrine of institutional
non-intervention, meaning that in situations that are of typical political nature, the
Court would refrain from exercising substantial review and defer to other authorities.
In other cases the Court was willing to intervene, but eventually back-tracked when it
came to the question of remedy. See HCJ 3358/95 Hofman v. Director Gen. of the
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is thus a unique case. This Article suggests that the best way to
understand Suszkin is under the U.S. doctrine of Fighting Words,
despite the fact that the Israeli Court made no mention of this
doctrine.
In any event, the case and the offense demonstrate the pos-
sible tension between relying on the concept of human dignity
to protect freedom of expression-as the situation is now in
Israel-and relying on an explicitly enumerated right that enjoys
a superior status, as is the case in the United States. This Article
suggested that even if the Knesset adds freedom of expression to
the list of enumerated rights in the Israeli Basic Laws, the Knes-
set, and subsequently the courts, will have to decide whether to
grant freedom of expression the special status it enjoys in the
United States over other liberties, or whether to adopt the com-
peting, "general rights" model, prevalent, for example, in Ca-
nada. Such a decision is not restricted to Israeli jurisprudence;
the same applies to the debate now raging in Europe, regarding
religious sentiments and hate speech.2 15 This Article hinted that
the language of human dignity, which stands at the foundation
of the general rights model, not only demarcates a line more
favorable for restricting group-based offensive speech, but is also
sensitive to arguments resting on passion, since the concept of
dignity, and the ways in which dignity may be offended, are not
necessarily divorced from passion.
In this context we should note the Court's own judgments-
speech-acts in and of themselves-have a hand in shaping the
sphere of public discourse because they contain an ethos-build-
ing element.216 Equally, if not more importantly, the judgments
Prime Minister's Office [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 345, 367. The contrary example is HCJ
1514/01 Gur-Aryeh v. Television & Radio Second Authority [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 267, in
which Justice Barak andJustice Dorner debated whether airing interviews with religious
Jews on TV on Shabbat (they were filmed during the week) violates a religious precept
(and therefore infringes freedom of religion) or "only" hurts their religious sentiments.
Similar judicial determinations regarding the scope of religious obligations were ad-
dressed by the Court in CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum
[1992] IsrSC 46(2) 464 and CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon-lezion Community Burial Society
[1999] IsrSC 53(3) 600. In both cases the Court ruled to allow writing Gregorian dates
on tombstones in a Jewish cemetery despite the injury to religious feelings of others.
215. See, e.g., Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c.1 (U.K.) (and the surround-
ing debates).
216. The "message" conveyed by the Court should be taken in context of its previ-
ous decisions. While Suszkin is to be arrested, a racist member of Parliament nonethe-
less deserves the protection of freedom of expression for expressing racist views. See
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shape this sphere because the judges' arguments influence the
nature of this sphere: reason-based or passion-based. Thus far,
the Israeli Court has been treading on both mills. The Court's
jurisprudence contains rhetoric rich with values and identity-
shaping pathos, extolling the centrality of basic democratic val-
ues as a national ideology.2 17 This line of reasoning resonates
with the early American cases, where judges, like Brandeis, told
the American people what its forefathers fought for, thereby
resting the decision primarily on passion and identity argu-
ments.2 1  Another line of argument that the Israeli Court at-
tempts, on occasion, to follow adopts a "colder" approach that
places speech as part of a rather formal system of constitutional
protections, emphasizing institutional roles, structures and con-
ceptual fit in a somewhat dispassionate tone of reason and cri-
tique. 219
At a higher level of abstraction, this paper advances the po-
sition that comparative law is notjust about comparing different
legal arrangements, and even not about seeking to organize the
different experiences into paradigms, or "families."220 Beyond
the normative claim embedded in comparative law-that each
nation's rules are measured not only by its citizens but also by
other nations for their justificatory power-comparative scholar-
HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broad. Auth. Mgmt. Bd. [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255. And a televi-
sion show can falsely portray national heroes who fought the Nazis as if they cracked
under interrogation and gave their friends away even though, in so doing, it humiliates
the heroes and their surviving families. See HCJ 6126/94 Senesh v. Broad. Auth. Mgrnt.
Bd. [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 817.
217. In the Senesh case, Justice Barak writes about the Jewish heritage of freedom
of expression, beginning in the days of the bible. Senesh IsrSC 53(3). As to other demo-
cratic values being in fact Jewish values, see Justice Barak in HCJ 6698/95 Qa'adan v.
Israel Land Administration [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 258, 280.
218. "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state
was to make men free to develop their faculties." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
219. In HCJ 651/03 Association for Civil-Rights in Israel v. Chairman of Central Elec-
tions Committee for Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 62, 72, Justice Procaccia empha-
sized the necessity of free speech for the democratic election process. In CA 316/03
Bachri v. The Movies' Review Council [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249, Justice Dorner says that
censoring the movie on the ground of falsehood will hurt the democratic process by
giving the authorities the power to choose right from wrong instead of the "market
place of ideas." Dorner states another reason: Expressing un-popular opinions releases
pressures in a non-violent way. Both are written in a rather "technical" language.
220. See generally Ruti Teitel, Book Review, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global
Age, 117 HARV. L. Rsv. 2570 (2004) (discussing different approaches to comparative
law).
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ship also participates in the shaping of "the rules of game,"
namely shaping what counts as a convincing argument in the
different domains of discourse.22 ' Comparative scholarship is
speech as well and thus how we treat "foreign law" can be seen as
either an exercise in reason or in passion. The former would
call upon judges and scholars to reason with foreign cases, to
elucidate their underlying rationale so as to understand the do-
mestic system better,222 or to inquire whether a certain principle
is universal. 22' Alternatively, comparative law may be conceived
of as an exercise in passion-based identity politics. Recently, pas-
sionate arguments were voiced about the (in)adequacy of rely-
ing on "foreign law" in domestic courts. 22 14 It seems that at least
some judges view a serious engagement with foreign systems as
undermining the national identity-or even the sovereignty-of
the domestic system.
It is therefore a challenge for the comparativists to establish
the sphere of trans-national discourse so that "debates about the
debate" can be conducted in a manner sensitive to method and
sensitive to the choices embedded in advancing a certain posi-
tion regarding comparativism. Are we in the business of estab-
lishing a trans-national domain of public reason-assuming such
a domain is tenable as more than an ideal type-or are we in the
business of developing a dimension of identity politics?
In this sense, Suszkin is more than a case about a Jewish set-
tler distributing offensive posters in Hebron. If we read the
Court decision carefully, it is a about the role of passion in the
221. In her book review, Teitel suggests that Comparative Constitutionalism "holds
out the aspiration of defining a normative constitutionalism that is universal." This aspira-
tion is motivated by the idea that "if there were a universal ideal of constitutionalism,
then all constitutions could be evaluated according to the same criteria." Id. at 2577 (emphasis
added).
222. See id. at 2570-96; Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: To-
ward a Theoy of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 INDIANA L.J. 819 (1999).
223. SeeJoHN RAwLs, THE LAw oF PEOPLEs 54-58 (1999).
224. As Justice Scalia said in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-27 (2005):
[T]he basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law should con-
form to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand. In
fact the Court itself does not believe it ... To invoke alien law when it agrees
with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-
making, but sophistry.
See generally Mark Tush net, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes,
with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REv. 649 (2004).
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emerging global discourse on human rights. 2 25 The Court has
made it clear that its decision is informed by the outrage
Suszkin's posters raise-the sense of indignation all Israelis must
feel-given the unique history, culture and religious sensitivities
of the place (and its politics). 2 26 The Court's rejection of the
type of sectarian passion expressed by Suszkin itself rests on pas-
sionate grounds. It has also made it clear that in so doing it is
not willing to rely on external sources, even though it often
turns to such sources, and even though such sources could have
proven helpful. Perhaps the Court thought that an explicit dia-
logue with foreign law would have clashed with its strong empha-
sis on core elements of Israeli identity. In other words, relying
on First Amendment jurisprudence would have entailed reli-
ance, at least in part, on a trans-national, if not universal, basis.
In so doing the Court would have been tripped by the underly-
ing challenge put forward by Suszkin, namely that the jurispru-
dence the Court was developing was not sensitive enough to the
Jewish character of Israel. The Court thus answered Suszkin in
her own terms, basing the decision on domestic Jewish values
and symbols. To the extent that comparative law is seen as rest-
ing on universal or trans-national reason, the Israeli judicial
move can thus be seen as delineating the limits of the compara-
tive enterprise. Locally generated passion may, on occasion,
chill the tendency to engage with jurisprudential sources ema-
nating from other jurisdictions, despite the otherwise strong in-
tellectual affinity between the systems.
225. For the emerging global discourse between judges and across jurisdictions,
see generally Ann Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994); Ann Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.
INr'L L.J. 191 (2003).
226. See CrimA 697/98 Suszkin v. Israel [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 289, 318.
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